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Mr. J.  A.  Scalice 
Chief Nuclear Officer and 
Executive  Vice  President 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
6A Lookout Place 
1101  Market Street 
Chattanooga,  Tennessee  37402-2801
SUBJECT: WATTS  BAR  NUCLEAR  PLANT,  UNIT  1 - ISSUANCE  OF AMENDMENT 
REGARDING  INCREASE OF REACTOR  POWER TO 3459  MEGAWATTS 
THERMAL  (TAC  NO.  MA9152)
Dear Mr.  Scalice: 
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.  31  to  Facility Operating License 
(FOL)  No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,  Unit 1.  This amendment  is  in response to your 
application dated June 7, 2000, as supplemented  by letters dated June 23, August 24, 
September 26, October  6, October 27, and November  16, 2000.  The amendment changes the 
FOL and Technical  Specifications to reflect an  increase  in the full core thermal power rating by 
1.4% from 3411  megawatts thermal  (MWt)  to 3459 MWt, based upon installation  of Caldon 
feedwater flow measurement instrumentation.  
A copy of the safety evaluation  is also enclosed.  Notice  of issuance will  be included  in the 
Commission's biweekly  Federal  Register notice.  
Sincerely, 
Robert E.  Martin,  Senior Project Manager,  Section 2 
Project Directorate  It 
Division of Licensing Project Management 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-390 
Enclosures:  1.  Amendment No.  31  to NPF-90 
2.  Safety Evaluation
cc w/enclosures:  See next page
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I"UNITED STATES 
NUCLEAR  REGULATORY  COMMISSION 
*  WASHINGTON.  D.C.  20555-0001 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
DOCKET NO. 50-390 
WATTS  BAR  NUCLEAR  PLANT,  UNIT  1 
AMENDMENT  TO FACILITY OPERATING  LICENSE 
Amendment  No.  31 
License  No. NPF-90 
The Nuclear  Regulatory Commission  (the Commission) has found that: 
A.  The application for amendment by Tennessee  Valley Authority (the licensee) dated 
June 7,  2000, as supplemented  by letters dated June 23, August 24, 
September 26, October 6, October 27, and November  16, 2000, complies with the 
standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the 
Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations  set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 
B.  The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, 
and the rules and regulations  of the Commission; 
C.  There  is reasonable  assurance (i)  that the activities authorized  by this amendment 
can beconducted  without endangering  the health and safety of the public,  and 
(ii)  that such activities  will be conducted  in compliance with the Commission's 
regulations; 
D.  The issuance of this amendment will  not be  inimical to the common defense and 
security  or to the health and safety of the public; and 
E.  The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51  of  the 
Commission's regulations  and all applicable requirements  have been satisfied.2 
2.  Accordingly, Section  2.C(1)  of the Operating  License is amended  and Section 2.C(5) is 
added, as indicated  in the attachment, and the license  is further amended  by changes to 
the Technical  Specifications  as indicated  in the attachment  to this license  amendment, 
and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating  License No.  NPF-90 is hereby amended to 
read as follows: 
(2)  Technical Specifications and Environmental  Protection Plan 
The Technical Specifications  contained  in Appendices A and  B, as revised through 
Amendment  No. 31, and the Environmental  Protection  Plan contained  in 
Appendix  B, both of which are attached  hereto,  are hereby incorporated  into this 
license.  TVA shall operate the facility in  accordance with the Technical 
Specifications and the  Environmental  Protection Plan.  
3.  This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall  be 
implemented  within 30 days of issuance.  
FOR THE NUCLEAR  REGULATORY  COMMISSION 
ImM  eOJ4ar  ~  ,  (ir  ec to r 
Office  of Nuclear Reactor  Regulation 
Attachment: 
Changes to the Technical 
Specifications  and Operating  License
Date of Issuance:  January 19,  2001ATTACHMENT  TO AMENDMENT  NO.  31 
FACILITY OPERATING  LICENSE NO.  NPF-90
DOCKET NO.  50-390 
Replace the following  pages of the Facility Operating  License with  the attached pages.  The 
revised  pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of 
change.
Remove  Pages 
3 
4
Insert Pages 
3 
4
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical  Specifications with the attached pages.  
The revised pages are identified  by amendment  number and contain  vertical lines indicating  the 
area of change.
Remove  Pages 
1.1-5 
2.0-2 
3.7-1 
3.7-3 
5.0-32 
5.0-32a 
B 3.7-3 
B 3.7-35
Insert Pages 
1.1-5 
2.0-2 
3.7-1 
3.7-3 
5.0-32 
5.0-32a 
5.0-32b 
B 3.7-3 
B 3.7-353
(4)  TVA,  pursuant  to  the  Act  and  10  CFR  Parts  30,  40  and  70,  to 
receive,  possess,  and  use  in  amounts  as  required,  any  byproduct, 
source  or  special  nuclear  material  without  restriction  to 
chemical  or  physical  form,  for  sample  analysis,  instrument 
calibration,  or  other  activity  associated  with  radioactive 
apparatus  or  components;  and 
(5)  TVA,  pursuant  to  the  Act  and  10  CFR  Parts  30,  40  and  70,  to 
possess,  but  not  separate,  such  byproduct  and  special  nuclear 
materials  as  may  be  produced  by  the  operation  of the  facility.  
C.  This  license  shall  be  deemed  to  contain  and  is  subject  to  the  conditions 
specified  in  the  Commission's  regulations  set  forth  in  10  CFR  Chapter  I 
and  is  subject  to all  applicable  provisions  of  the  Act  and  to  the  rules, 
regulations,  and  orders  of  the  Commission  now  or  hereafter  in  effect,  and 
is  subject  to  the  additional  conditions  specified  or  incorporated  below.  
(1)  Maximum  Power  Level 
TVA  is  authorized  to  operate  the facility  at  reactor  core  power 
levels  not  in  excess  of  3459  megawatts  thermal.  
(2)  Technical  Specifications  and  Environmental  Protection  Plan 
The  Technical  Specifications  contained  in  Appendix  A,  as  revised 
through  Amendment  No.  31  ,  and  the  Environmental  Protection  Plan 
contained  in  Appendix  B,  both  of  which  are  attached  hereto,  are 
hereby  incorporated  into  this  license.  TVA  shall  operate  the 
facility  in  accordance  with  the  Technical  Specifications  and  the 
Environmental  Protection  Plan.  
(3)  Safety Parameter  Display System  (SPDS)  (Section  18.2  of  SER 
Supplements  5  and  15) 
Prior  to  startup  following  the  first  refueling  outage,  TVA  shall 
accomplish  the  necessary  activities,  provide  acceptable 
responses,  and  implement  all  proposed  corrective  actions  related 
to  having  the Watts  Bar  Unit  I  SPDS  operational.  
(4)  Vehicle  Bomb  Control  ProQram  (Section  13.6.9  of  SSER  20) 
During  the  period  of  the  exemption  granted  in  paragraph  2.D.(3) 
of this  license,  in  implementing  the  power  ascension  phase  of  the 
approved  initial  test program,  TVA  shall  not  exceed  50%  power 
until  the  requirements  of  10  CFR  73.55(c)(7)  and  (8)  are  fully 
implemented.  TVA  shall  submit  a  letter  under  oath  or  affirmation 
when  the  requirements  of  73.55(c)(7)  and  (8)  have  been  fully 
implemented.
Amendment  314
(5)  Reactor  Vessel  Fracture  Toughness  Testing 
Supplemental  fracture  toughness  testing  (J-R)  will  be  performed  in 
accordance  with  a  testing  procedure  that  has  been  previously 
reviewed  and  approved  by  the  NRC  staff  on  Surveillance  Capsule  W 
specimens  (removed  from  Cycle  3  Refueling  Outage)  and  Capsule  X 
specimens  (to  be  removed  from  Cycle  5  Refueling  Outage).  The 
supplemental  test  results  will  be  included  in  the  report  to  be 
submitted  in  accordance  with  10  CFR  50,  Appendix  H requirements  for 
each  Capsule  specimen  and  will  include  an  evaluation  of  the  effects 
on  TVA's  equivalent  margins  analysis  which  was  submitted  October 
15,  1993  and  approved  by  NRC  in  Supplemental  Safety  Evaluation 
Report  (SSER)  14.  
D.  The  following  exemptions  are  authorized  by  law,  will  not  present  an  undue 
risk to the  public  health  and  safety,  and  are  consistent  with  the  common 
defense  and  security.  Therefore,  these  exemptions  are  granted  pursuant  to 
10 CFR  50.12.  
(1)  Deleted 
(2)  The  facility  was  previously  granted  an  exemption  from  the 
criticality  monitoring  requirements  of  10  CFR  70.24  (see  Special 
Nuclear  Material  License  No.  SNM-1861  dated  September  5,  1979).  
The  technical  justification  is  contained  in  Section  9.1  of 
Supplement  5  to  the  Safety  Evaluation  Report,  and  the  staff's 
environmental  assessment  was  published  on  April  18,  1985  (50  FR 
15516).  The  facility  is  hereby  exempted  from  the  criticality alarm 
system  provisions  of  10  CFR  70.24  so  far  as  this  section  applies  to 
the  storage  of  fuel  assemblies  held  under  this  license.  
(3)  The  facility  requires  an  exemption  from  10  CFR  73.55(c)(10).  The 
justification  for this  exemption  is  contained  in  Section  13.6.9  of 
Supplement  15  and  20  to  the Safety  Evaluation  Report.  The  staff's 
environmental  assessment  was  published  on  April  25,  1995  (60  FR 
20291).  Pursuant  to  10  CFR  73.5,  the  facility  is  exempted  from  the 
stated  implementation  schedule  of  the  surface  vehicle  bomb  rule, 
and  may  implement  the  same  as  late as  February  17,  1996.  
(4)  The  facility  was  previously  granted  an  exemption  from  certain 
requirements  of  10  CFR  73.55(d)(5)  relating  to  the  returning  of 
picture  badges  upon  exit  from  the  protected  areas,  such  that 
individuals  not  employed  by  TVA  who  are  authorized  unescorted 
access  into  protected  areas  can  take  their  badges  offsite  (see 
59  FR  66061,  December  22,  1994).  The  granting  of  this  exemption  is 
hereby  affirmed.
Amernent  311.1  Definitions
PHYSICS  TESTS 
(continued)
PRESSURE  AND 
TEMPERATURE  LIMITS 
REPORT 
QUADRANT  POWER  TILT 
RATIO  (QPTR) 
RATED THERMAL  POWER 
(RTP) 
REACTOR  TRIP 
SYSTEM  (RTS)  RESPONSE 
TIME 
SHUTDOWN  MARGIN  (SDM)
a.  Described  in  Chapter  14.  Initial  Test  Program 
of  the  FSAR: 
b.  Authorized  under  the  provisions  of  10  CFR  50.59;  or 
c.  Otherwise  approved  by  the  Nuclear  Regulatory 
Commission.  
The  PTLR  is  the  unit  specific  document  that  provides 
the  RCS  pressure  and  temperature  limits  for  heatup, 
cooldown.  low  temperature  operation,  criticality,  and 
hydrostatic  testing  as  well  as  heatup  and  cooldown  rates 
for  the  current  reactor  vessel  fluence  period.  These 
pressure  and  temperature  limits  shall  be  determined  for 
each  fluence  period  in  accordance  with  Specification  5.9.6.  
Plant  operation  within  these  operating  limits  is  addressed 
in  LCO  3.4.3.  "RCS  Pressure  and  Temperature  (P/T)  Limits," 
and  LCO  3.4.12.  "Cold  Overpressure  Mitigation  System 
(COMS)." 
QPTR  shall  be  the  ratio  of  the  maximum  upper  excore 
detector  calibrated  output  to  the  average  of  the  upper 
excore  detector  calibrated  outputs.  or  the  ratio  of  the 
maximum  lower  excore  detector  calibrated  output  to  the 
average  of  the  lower  excore  detector  calibrated  outputs.  
whichever  is  greater.  
RTP  shall  be  a total  reactor  core  heat  transfer 
rate  to  the  reactor  coolant  of  3459  MWt.  
The  RTS  RESPONSE  TIME  shall  be  that  time  interval  from 
when  the  monitored  parameter  exceeds  its  RTS  trip 
setpoint  at  the  channel  sensor  until  loss  of  stationary 
gripper  coil  voitage.  The  response  time  may  be  measured  by 
means  of  any  series  of  sequential.  overlapping,  or  total 
steps  so  that  the  entire  response  time  is  measured.  In 
lieu  of  measurement,  response  time  may  be  verified  for 
selected  components  provided  that  the  components  and  the 
methodology  for  verification  have  been  previously  reviewed 
and  approved  by  the  NRC.  
SDM  shall  be  the  instantaneous  amount  of  reactivity  by 
which  the  reactor  is  subcritical  or 
(continued)
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Reactor  Core  Safety
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Limits3.7.1  Main  Steam  Safety  Valves  (MSSVs)
LCO  3.7.1 Five  MSSVs  per  steam  generator  shall  te OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:  MODES  1.  2.  and  3.  
ACTIONS 
---------------------------------------  NOTE  ----------------------------
Separate  Condition  entry  is  allowed  for  each  MSSV.  
CONDITION  REQUIRED  ACTION  COMPLETION  TIME 
A.  One  or  more  steam  A.1  Reduce  THERMAL  POWER  to  4  hours 
generators  with  one  ￿  58  % RTP.  
MSSV  inoperable.  
B.  One  or  more  steam  B.1  Reduce  THERMAL  POWER  to  4  hours 
generators  with  two  or  less  than  or  equal  to 
more  MSSVs  inoperable,  the  Maximum  Allowable 
%  RTP  soecified  in 
Table  3.7.1-i  for  the 
number  of  OPERABLE 
MSSVs.  
AND 
-----  ------  -NOTE-----
Only  required  in  MODE  I 
B.2  Reduce  the  Power  Range 
Neutron  Flux  - High 
reactor  trip  setpoint  36 hours 
to  less  than  or  equal 
to  the  Maximum 
Allowable  %  RTP 
specified  in  Table 
3.7.1-1  for  the  number 
of  OPERABLE  MSSVs.  
C.  Required  Action  and  C.1  Be  in  MODE  3.  6  hours 
associated  Completion 
Time  not met.  AND 
OR  C.2  Be  in  MODE  4.  12 hours 
One  or  more  steam 
generators  with  2  4 
MSSVs  inoperable.
Watts  Bar-Unit  1
P.SE , -: 
1.7.I
3.7-1 Amendment  i9.  31Table  3.7.1-1  (page  1  of  1) 
OPERABLE  Main  Steam  Safety  Valves  versus 
Maximum  Allowable  Power
NUMBER  OF  OPERABLE  MSSVs  MAXIMUM  ALLOWABLE  POWER 
PER  STEAM  GENERATOR  (%  RTP) 
3  ￿  41 
2  ￿25
Amendment  19.  31
3.-
Watts  Bar-Unit  1 3.7-35.9  Reporting  Requirements  (continued) 
5.9.5  CORE  OPERATING  LIMITS  REPORT  (COLR) 
a.  Core  operating  limits  shall  be  established  prior  to  the 
initial  and  each  reload  cycle,  or  prior  to  any  remaining 
portion  of  a cycle,  and  shall  be  documented  in  the  COLR  for 
the  following: 
LCO  3.1.4  Moderator  Temperature  Coefficient 
LCO  3.1.6  Shutdown  Bank  Insertion  Limit 
LCO  3.1.7  Control  Bank  Insertion  Limits 
LCO  3.2.1  -Heat Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor 
LCO  3.2.2  Nuclear  Enthalpy  Rise  Hot  Channel  Factor 
LCO  3.2.3  Axial  Flux  Difference 
LCO  3.9.1  Boron  Concentration 
b.  The  analytical  methods  used  to  determine  the  core  operating 
limits  shall  be  those  previously  reviewed  and  approved  by  the 
NRC.  When  an  initial  assumed  power  level  of  102  percent  of 
rated  thermal  power  is  specified  in  a previously  approved 
method.  100.6  percent  of  rated  thermal  power  may  be  used  only 
when  feedwater  flow  measurement  (used  as  input  for  reactor 
thermal  power  measurement)  is  provided  by  the  leading  edge 
flowmeter  (LEFM)  as  described  in  document  number  6 listed 
below.  When  feedwater  flow  measurements  from  the  LEFM  are 
unavailable,  the  originally  approved  initial  power  level  of 
102  percent  of  rated  thermal  power  (311  MWt)  shall  be  used.  
The  approved  analytical  methods  are  specifically  those 
described  in  the  following  documents: 
1. WCAP-9272-P-A.  WESTINGHOUSE  RELOAD  SAFETY  EVALUATION 
METHODOLCGY",  July1985  (W  Proprietary).  (Methodology  for 
oecifcations  3.1.4  - Moderator  Temperature  Coefficient, 
5  - Shutdown  Bank  Insertion  Limit,  3.1.7  - Control  Bank 
Insertion  Limits,  3.2.1  - Heat  Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor, 
3.2.2  - Nuclear  Enthalphy  Rise  Hot  Channel  Factor,  3.2.3 
Axial  Flux  Difference,  and  3.9.1  - Boron  Concentration.  
(continued)
Watts  Bar-Unit  1 5.0-32 Amendment  315.9  Reporting  Requirements  (continued) 
5.9.5  CORE  OPERATING  LIMITS  REPORT  (COLR)  (continued) 
2a.  ,,P-12945-P-A,  Volume  1  (Revision  2)  ana  Volumes  2 
through  5  (Revision  1).  "Code  Qualification  Document  for 
Best-Estimate  Loss  of  Coolant  Analysis."  March  1998  (W 
Proprietary).  (Methodology  for  Specification  3.2.1 
Heat  Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor,  and  3.2.2  - Nuclear  Enthalpy 
Rise  Hot  Channel  Factor).  
b.  WCAP-10054-P-A,  'Small  Break  ECCS  Evaluation  Model  Using 
NOTRUMP  Code."  August  1985.  Addendum  2,  Rev.  1:  "'Addendum 
to  the- Westinghouse  Small  Break  ECCS  Evaluation  Model 
using  the  NOTRUMP  Code:  Safety  Injection  into  the  Broken 
Loop  and  COSI  Condensation  Model."  July  1997.  (W 
Proprietary).  (Methodology  for  Specifications  3.2.1 
Heat  Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor,  and  3.2.2  - Nuclear  Enthalpy 
Rise  Hot  Channel  Factor).  
3. WCAP-10216-P-A.  Revision  !A,  "RELAXATION  OF  CONSTANT  AXIAL 
OFFSET  CONTROL  F(Q)  SURVEhLLANCE  TECHNICAL  SPECIFICATION." 
February  1994  (W  Proprietary).(Methodoiogy  for 
Specifications  3.2.1  - Heat  Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor  (W(Z) 
Surveillance  Requirements  For  F(Q)  Methodology)  and 
3.2.3  - Axial  Flux  Difference  (Relaxed  Axial  Offset 
Control).) 
4. W'CAP-12610-P-A.  "VANTAGE  FUEL  ASSEMBLY  REFERENCE  CORE 
REPORT."  April  1995.  (W  Proprietary).  (Methodology  for 
Specification  3.2.1  - Heat  Flux  Hot  Channel  Factor).  
5. WCAP-15088-P,  Rev  1.  "Safety  Evaluation  Supporting  A More 
Negative  EOL  Moderator  Temperature  Coefficient  Technical 
Specification  for  the  Watts  Bar  Nuclear  Plant."  July  1999.  
(W  Proprietary),  as  approved  by  the  NRC  staff's  Safety 
Evaluation  accompanying  the  issuance  of Amendment  No.  20 
(Methodology  for  Specification  3.1.4Moderator  Temperature 
Coefficient.).  
(continued)
wat~ts  bar-unit  I S. 0-32a Amendment  11,  20.  21,  315.9  Reporting  Requirements  (continued)
5.9.50
Watts  Bar-Unit  1  5.0-32b
Amendment  31
CORE  OPERATUIG  LIMITS  REPORT  (CLR  c 
6. C.  A  . don  . I  nc.  ineeri  ng  Reoor;  . - ,  'mpr  oving  Thermal 
Accuracy  and  Plant  Safety  While  Increasing  Operating  Power 
Level  Using  the  LEFMv01  System."  Revision  0.  March  1997; 
and  Caldon.  Inc.  Engineering  Report-160P.  "Supplement  to 
Topical  Report  ER-80P:  Basis  for  a  Power  Uprate  With  the 
LEFMTm."  Revision  0.  May  2000:  as  approved  by  the  NRC 
staff's  Safety  Evaluation  accompanying  the  issuance  of 
Amendment  No.31 
(continued)
Watts  Bar-Unit  I 5. 0-32bB  A  SES,  "Iconti  nued )
arc  s- ,e~nt.,  analysi  s  rec'U4res  ta  eMSSVs Der-  steam 
neneratonr  be  OPERABLE  to, onovice  ove~ncressure  rcrrotecý,on  ro 
desi1gn  DoA.s is  trans ien  ts  !-c  Curnr4 .o  a  t  0.  6%  RT  P.  The 
!fýO  requi~res  that  five  MSSVs  per steam  generator  be  OPERABLE  in 
compli  .ance  with  Re-ference  2 and  the  DBA  analysis.  
The  OPERABILITY  of the  MSSVs is  defined  as  the  ability to 
open  upon  demand  within  the  setpoint  tolerances  to  relieve  steam 
generator  overpressure.  and  reseat  when  pressure has  been 
reduced.  The  OPERABILITY  of  the  MSSVs  is  determined  by  periodic 
.surveillance  testing  in  accordance with  the  Inservice 
Testing  Program.  
This  LCO  provides assurance  that  the MSSVs will  perform 
their  designed safety  functions  to  mitigate the  consequences of 
accidents  that could  result in  a  challenge  to  the  RCPB,  or Main 
St.."am  System integrity.
APPLICABILITY  In  MODES 1.  2,  and 3.  PV  i~~  er  steam generator  are  required 
:_o  'ce  DPERABLE  t!o  pre,,entL  Mlair.-S-eam  Sýystem  overpressuration.  
In  >L  and5. 1-nene  aý-e  no  :n-i-etnsi  eros  requirngh 
,mssVs.  The  stelam  genera,-ors  Are not  normally used  fcr 
heat  remioval  in  MODES 5  and  6,  and  thus  cannot be 
overoressurized:  there is  no  requirement for  the  MSSVs  to be 
OPERABLE in  these MODES.  
ACTIONS  The  ACTION*S  table  is  modifýied  by  a  Note  indicating  that 
separa7te-  Condition entr  is  allowed.  for  each  MSSV.  
'With  one  or  more  MSSVs  inoperable,  action must be  taken  so  that 
the  available  MSSV  relieving capacity meets Reference 2 
requi rements.  
Operation  with  less  than  all  five  I-SSI.,  OPERABLE  for  each 
steam generator is  permissible, if'  THERMAL  POWER is  limited to 
the relief capacity of  the  rema-ining  MSSVs.  This  is  accomplished 
by restricting THERMAL  POWER  so that  the  energy transfer  to  the 
most limiting steam generator  is  not greater than  the  available 
relief capacity in  that steam generat-or.  
(continued)
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APPLICABLE  oower.  Single  fail  ures  tha:  a~sc affect  this  event  include 
-SAFETY  ANALYSES  the  fc'  o  wng: 
(continuea) 
a.  <lure  of  the  ciese  generator  -owering  the  motor  driven 
AFWA$  Dump  to  the  .jra•fecec  steam  generators  (requiring 
aCj2iional  steam  to  drive  the  remaining  AFW  pump  turbine): 
and 
b.  Failure  of  the steam  driven  AFW  pump  (requiring  a  longer 
time  for  cooldown  using  only  one  motor  driven  AFW  pump).  
These  are  not  usually  the  limiting  failures  in  terms  of 
consequences  for  these  events.  
A nonlimiting  event  considered  in  CST  inventory  determinations  is 
a  break  in  either  the  main  feedwater  bypass  line  or  AFW  line  near 
where  the  two  join.  This  break  has  the  potential  for  dumping 
condensate  until  terminated  by  operator  action.  This  loss  of 
condensate  inventory  is  partially  compensated  for  by  the 
retention  of  steam  generator  inventory.  
Because  the  CST  is  the  preferred  source  of  feedwater  and  is 
relied  or almost  exclusively  for accidents  and  transients,  the 
CST  satisfies  Criterion  3  of  the  NRC  Policy  Statement.  
LCO  As  the  preferred  water  source  to  satisfy  accident  analysis 
assumotions,  the  CST  must  contain  sufficient  cooling  water  to 
remove  decay  heat  for  2 hours  foliowing  a  reactor  trip  from 
100.6% RTP,  and  then  to  cool  ocwn  the  RCS  to  RHR  entry 
conditions,  assuming  .3  coi,;clden  s  of  offsite  power  and  the 
most  adverse  single  failure,  d'  rig  '-is,  it  must  retain 
sufficient  water  to  ers.•re  edece  net  positive  suction  head  for 
the  AFW  pumps  dr'  :-.o,:3  . ]s  -,  s  account  for  any  losses 
from  the  steam  -r-;.n  AF. 1 o  ý:wo  turiýne.  :r  before  isolating  AFW 
to  a  broken  '!e.  
The  CST  level  required  is  equi,  ;ert  to  a  usable  volume  of 
Ž200,000 gallons,  which  is  based  on  holding  the  unit  in  MODE  3 
for  2 hours,  followed  by  a  cooldown  to  RHR  entry  conditions  at 
500F/hour.  This  basis  is  established  in  Reference  4  and  exceeds 
the  volume  required  by  the  accident  analysis.  
(continued)
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
By letter dated June 7, 2000, as supplemented  by letters dated June 23, August 24, 
September 26, October 6, October 27, and November  16, 2000, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA,  or licensee) for the Watts Bar Nuclear  Plant Unit 1 (WBN) submitted 
information and requested technical specification  (TS) changes to increase the power  level by 
1.4% (References  1 and 2).  WBN  is currently operating at 3411  Megawatts  thermal (MWt).  
The requested  change  will  raise the  normal operating power to  3459 MWt.  The request is 
based on the installation  of a Caldon Leading  Edge  Flow Meter  (LEFM)  in the feedwater pipe 
from the main feedwater header, which  reduces the flow and temperature uncertainties,  and the 
revision of Appendix K to Title  10, Code of Federal  Regulations (10  CFR),  Part 50, which  no 
longer  requires a 2.0% flow uncertainty for the Loss of Coolant Accident  (LOCA) analysis.  The 
LEFM operating principle and the justification of the uncertainty are discussed in the Caldon 
Engineering Report 80P (ER-80P)  (Ref.  3),  which was  used in the approval  of a similar power 
uprate for the Comanche  Peak Unit 2 power plant.  The  ER-80P report has been reviewed and 
approved by NRC as a generic topical report by letter dated March 8,  1999 (Reference  13).  A 
supplemental report, Caldon,  Inc.  Engineering  Report-1 60P, "Supplement to Topical  Report 
ER-80P:  Basis for a Power Uprate  With the  LEFM System," Revision 0,  May 2000,  was 
provided specifically for the WBN plant as Enclosure 2 to TVA's submittal of June  7, 2000.  The 
review of the applicability of ER-80P to WBN and of the supplemental  Caldon-160P report is 
presented  in  this safety evaluation.  
The flow uncertainty  is embodied in the analytical  methods currently listed in TS 5.9.5b, 
including the references for LOCA analysis.  The licensee proposes to retain these reports 
which describe the LOCA analysis methodology.  TVA requests Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) approval  for the same methodologies for the uprated power level and the 
addition in the references of the Caldon Engineering  Report 80P and its supplement, Caldon 
Engineering  Report - 160P.  The licensee proposes to modify the following TSs and portions of 
the Facility Operating License (FOL): 
FOL Section 2.C(1)  identifying the maximum core power  level, 
The reactor safety limits in TS Figure 2.1.1-1,
ENCLOSURE-2
TS Section 3.7.1,  limiting condition for operation  (LCO)  on main steam safety valves, 
The TS BASES  section B 3.7.1  for the main steam safety valves and section 
B 3.7.6 for the condensate  storage tanks are revised to reflect that the safety analysis 
performed at 102%  of the previously authorized  3411  MWt power  level is equivalent to 
100.6% of the new power level of 3459  MWt.  These changes  to the BASES  are 
consistent with the changes made to the TS and are, therefore, acceptable.  
The licensee offers probabilistic arguments to demonstrate that the probability of exceeding 
102%  of rated power with the present instrumentation and  limits is more likely than to exceed 
the 100.6%  of the revised limits with the LEFM  instrument.  Part of the argument is based on 
the fact that the LEFM  has an on-line self-check mechanism for the instrument's operation.  
2.0  REACTOR  SYSTEMS  EVALUATION 
2.1  Introduction 
The operating  principle for the  LEFM  is based on measuring the time needed by ultrasound to 
traverse a certain distance in the same direction and against the direction of the feedwater flow.  
The measurement  section is located on the 32-inch main feedwater header pipe and holds 
eight ultrasonic transducer assemblies.  Each transducer may send or receive sound pulses 
and is oriented  at a 450 angle with respect to the feedwater flow.  The associated electronics 
are located  in the auxiliary instrument  room.  An  important feature  of the LEFM,  which  is 
discussed further  in section 5.2 of this report,  is the ability to self-check  and assure that its 
performance  is consistent with the design specifications.  The LEFM measures flow and 
temperature  to an uncertainty  which yields a power uncertainty of ± 0.6%.  
2.2  The  Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) 
The total  reactor thermal  power output was set at 3475 MWt (3459 core + 16 primary pump 
heat input) which  is 1.4%  higher than the current rating of 3427 MWt rating  (3411  core + 16 
primary heat pump input).  The licensee states that with the above changes the resulting 
changes  in the primary and secondary parameters are minimal.  For example,  differential T-hot 
is equal to the differential  T-cold  (ATht = - ATr,  = 0.4 degrees Farenheit  (OF)).  On  the 
secondary side steam  temperature,  Tstea,,,m  decreased by 1.40F, steam pressure,  Psleam, 
decreased  by 11  pounds per square inch (psi), steam flow increased by 1.9%  and feedwater 
temperature, T., increased by 1.80F.  These are minor changes for the operating parameters of 
the'steam supply system and are acceptable.  
2.3  Design Transients 
The primary side transients (LOCAs,  control rod transients, etc.) would be subjected to minimal 
changes as indicated by the minor changes in the primary side parameter values.  The results 
of the large break LOCA analysis show that peak cladding temperature (PCT) increased about 
120F, to a value of 17730F, which satisfies  the 10 CFR 50.46 requirement that PCT shall  not 
exceed 22000F.  
The secondary  side parameters were also minimally affected by the uprating as indicated  in 
Section 2.2 above.  For example,  a 1.80F increase in the feedwater temperature is insignificant-3-
with respect to the range of analyzed feedwater temperatures.  Consequently, the secondary 
side transients  (steam line break, atmospheric  steam dump, etc.) are also minimally affected.  
Therefore,  the range of analyzed feedwater temperatures  in the analysis  of  record 
encompasses  the variation for the proposed power uprate.  
The auxiliary equipment transients of interest are those at full nuclear supply system  power.  
The analysis  of record  is for the range  of Thot = 630°F and  Tcold = 560'F.  The  uprated power 
values are well  within the above limits, therefore, the analysis of record for the auxiliary 
equipment transients is valid.  
In summary, from the review of the design transients, we conclude that no modifications are 
required due to the proposed power uprate.  
2.4  NSSS Fluids 
The  reactor coolant system  (RCS) consists  of four loops and the associated equipment and 
instrumentation.  The licensee states that the minimum required  pressurizer spray flow of 
900 gallons per minute  (gpm) can be achieved for the power uprate conditions.  Likewise, the 
maximum estimated Thot of  619.1 OF  is lower than the limiting value in  the analysis of 630°F and 
even less than the  loop design value of 650 0F.  The pressurizer discharge rate at full power is 
unaffected because the average temperature  has not changed.  
The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is unaffected  by the power uprate because 
the calculated  Tcold  of 557.30F is lower than the design value of 560'F and much  lower than the 
shell side design temperature of 650°F for the regenerative  heat exchanger.  The NRC staff 
concludes that operation  of the CVCS  is unaffected  by the power uprate.  The safety injection 
system performance  also is not affected by the power uprate  because there is  no change  in the 
RCS operating  pressure and, therefore,  the flow injection  rate.  The residual heat removal 
(RHR)  system consists of two trains including a heat exchanger, pumps, piping, valves and 
instrumentation.  The licensee states that single train analysis indicates that the RHR system 
meets the design  requirement  that a cooldown  can be accomplished within 36 hours.  
Likewise,  a normal cooldown can be achieved within 20 hours, which is the design value.  The 
cold overpressure mitigating  system (COMS) is not affected by changes  in the full-power  rating.  
The plant control  system was evaluated  to assure that it can  respond to the design transients 
without generating a reactor trip.  Because, the analysis was performed at 102% power, the 
maximum power  level encompassed  by the proposed power uprate, the analysis  of record is 
applicable.  There will be a small increase  in the decay heat level for the spent fuel pool cooling, 
but the existing analysis contains sufficient  margin to accommodate  the decay heat increase 
from the 1.4% power uprate.  The NRC staff concludes that the CVCS, the  RHR, the COMS, 
the control system and the spent fuel pool cooling are not affected or that they can 
accommodate the proposed power uprate.  
The NSSS balance  of plant (BOP) interface consists of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) 
the steam generator (SG) atmospheric relief valves  (ARVs) and the main steam isolation valves 
(MSIVs).  The WBN MSSVs are designed to provide  108.1%  of the maximum calculated  steam 
flow.  The 1.9%  steam flow increase due to the power uprate is well within the design  limits (see 
page E1-8 of  Ref.  1).  The ARVs  were sized based on a core  power of 3564 MWt and a 2% 
uncertainty.  This power level  bounds the 1.4%  uprate power level of 3459  MWt.  Therefore,  the 
ARVs  are adequately sized for the  1.4% power uprate.  The MSIVs are sized and designed for-4-
zero power maximum  differential pressure at the break, therefore, the proposed power uprate 
does not affect their design parameters.  We conclude that the  NSSS and BOP interface is not 
affected or is within the plant design parameters.  
The steam dump system is required to discharge 40% of  the rated full power steam flow.  The 
WBN system  has been designed with  a capacity of 42.4% which accommodates the steam flow 
increase of 1.9% due to the power uprate.  
The feedwater isolation  valves are designed to withstand the dynamic loads created from 
maximum  feedwater flow following a steam line break from  no-load  conditions.  Therefore, the 
feedwater isolation valves are not affected from the proposed  power uprate.  The condensate 
feedwater pumps are sized to provide 96% flow at full power  with a 100 psi pressure above  full 
load pressure.  Based on the current design, it is concluded  that the pumps are sized to 
accommodate  the 1.4%  full power  level  increase.  
The auxiliary feedwater system takes suction from the condensate storage tank to fulfill the 
engineered safety function during a transient to enable the plant to be placed in  a safe 
shutdown condition.  The analysis of  record used a power  level of  102%  to estimate  the 
condensate tank capacity of 200,000 gallons.  The  NRC staff concludes that the condensate 
tank has been sized adequately for the  1.4%  power uprate.  
The SG blowdown (SGBD) rate does not depend on the power level,  rather it depends on 
chemistry control and tube-sheet sweep requirements  to control the buildup  of solids.  The 
SGBD  control valve capacity is considered adequate because  the full  power steam pressure 
has changed by an insignificant amount.  
2.5  NSSS Components 
There are two effects which need to be considered for the proposed power uprate:  (1) vessel 
outlet temperature  increase and (2) pressure vessel fluence increase and corresponding 
increase  in the vessel  RTNDT.  The vessel outlet temperature  will increase from 618.7 0F to 
619.1 OF.  Therefore, going to power and cooling  down  can be considered  as more severe 
transients than before the power uprate.  The licensee states that an evaluation  of the 
difference  in stress intensity and the maximum cumulative fatigue usage factors are negligible, 
therefore, the power uprate effect is also negligible.  
The evaluation  of the effects of any potential increase in  pressure vessel fluence are presented 
in Section 3.0 of this report.  
The core thermal and hydraulic conditions after the power uprate will differ very slightly from 
before the uprate.  Evaluation  of the core bypass flow, the control rod assembly drop time and 
the hydraulic  lift forces indicated that they are within the design  range.  It was also estimated 
that the power uprate would have a negligible effect on baffle jetting.  The mechanical 
evaluation of the  LOCA hydraulic and dynamic loads was performed assuming flows higher 
than those required  in the power uprate.  The water density would change by a minute amount 
(corresponding to a 0.40F temperature change) which is within  the measurement uncertainty 
range and is considered  negligible.-5-
The structural  integrity of the core  internals was evaluated  for stresses due to thermal  gradients 
from temperature  differences due to heat generation  in  the fuel and  gamma heat deposition in 
the core  internal components.  The baffle core-barrel  region was analyzed for flow and power 
levels bounding those  of the power uprate.  Structural evaluation  of the  upper and lower core 
plates indicates that the stresses and the fatigue usage are  still within  the design limits.  
The control  rod drive mechanisms  (CRDM) were analyzed  to evaluate the 0.4°F change in the 
coolant operating temperature.  It was determined  that they are still within the design limits.  
The reactor coolant piping  and supports were examined  for the  power uprate conditions  and it 
was found  that the potential  load increase  is bounded by the analysis of record.  
The reactor coolant pumps  will experience a decrease in  inlet fluid temperature of 0.50F.  The 
licensee's evaluation indicated that the stress and fatigue usage factors are within  design  limits.  
The same holds true for the reactor coolant pump motors.  
The SG structural  integrity and fatigue analyses were examined  to assure compliance  with the 
requirements  of the American  Society of Mechanical  Engineers  (ASME) code.  It was 
concluded that the uprate conditions  still meet the ASME  requirements.  In addition, the thermal 
hydraulic performance  was examined  for circulation  ratio/bundle  liquid flow, hydrodynamic 
stability and secondary side pressure losses.  The circulation ratio is within the design  limits, the 
damping factor  is still highly negative and the secondary pressure losses are within  design 
limits.  Moisture  carry-over is another parameter which could be affected  because of the 
reduction  of the steam pressure and temperature  and increase in steam  flow.  Evaluation  of the 
amount of the moisture carry-over indicated that it is still within the acceptable  limits.  The 
U-tube bend fatigue was examined  to determine whether there could be increased  number of 
tubes requiring plugging.  It was determined  that no additional tubes would require plugging.  
The known tube degradation  mechanisms were evaluated for the power uprate conditions and 
TVA concluded that they would  have a negligible effect.  Because  of the reduced steam 
pressure  in the SG, the 40% through  wall plugging  criterion was reexamined.  TVA stated that 
there was  margin  in the original calculation  and in the eddy current detection  and, therefore,  the 
criterion was judged to be adequate.  
Approval  of an alternate repair criterion  (ARC) for plugging of tubes with flaws in the tubesheet 
region of the SGs was granted  by Amendment No.  27 to the  FOL on September 8, 2000.  
Review of the supporting  calculations indicates that they were developed for a differential 
pressure of  1400 psi.  The SG conditions for the power uprate indicate that the differential 
pressure  is only 1303 psi,  therefore, the power uprate  is bounded  by the existing limits.  
The pressurizer structural parameters  remain bounded by the parameters  of record.  Likewise 
the NSSS auxiliary equipment  (heat exchangers, pumps, valves and tanks) fatigue analysis is 
bounded  by the analysis of record.  
2.6  NSSS Accident Analysis 
The transients in Chapter  15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report  (FSAR)  are considered for the 
conditions in the power uprate.-6-
SG Tube Rupture  (SGTR).  
There are two issues associated  with the SGTR: margin  to overfill  and offsite  radiation doses.  
The analysis of record  used  102% power, therefore, the analysis  is valid for both areas.  
Steam  Line Break.  
The analysis of record was performed at 102%  of  rated power for both inside and outside 
containment.  Because the SG steam pressure was reduced from 958 pounds per square inch 
absolute  (psia) to 947 psia, the flow rate from the steamline break will be smaller.  Assuming 
saturated steam, the total enthalpy value will  be smaller and thus, bounded by the analysis of 
record.  
Feedline  Break.  
The objective  of this analysis  is to assure that the flooding  level  in the main steam valve vault is 
limited to within prescribed  limits.  The existing analysis established that mass release was 
maximized at a feedwater temperature  of 4250F.  Because the feedwater temperature  will 
increase  by 1.8°F, the mass release will  be lower.  In addition, the feedwater pressure  will  be 
lower, thereby decreasing  the pressure at the break and the flow.  Thus,  the mass release  will 
be bounded by the analysis  of record.  
Short Term Steam-Line  and  Feed-Line Break Releases.  
The mass and enthalpy releases are used to estimate compartment pressurization.  The 
analysis parameters  are chosen  at no-load  conditions to maximize  the release.  Therefore, the 
results are independent of the power  uprate and the analysis of record  is valid.  
Long Term  LOCA Containment  Integrity Analysis.  
The purpose  of this analysis  is to establish  the adequacy of the containment for a large break 
LOCA.  The analysis of record utilized a power level  of  104.4%, which bounds the level of the 
proposed  power uprate.  The analysis of record is acceptable.  
Short Term  LOCA Mass  and Energy Release.  
The analysis supports loop sub-compartment,  reactor cavity and pressurizer enclosure 
pressurization.  The duration  of these releases is associated with the blowdown  phase of the 
transient.  The correlation  used for the estimate  does not depend on the power level, thus, the 
analysis of record is valid.  
Best Estimate  Large Break LOCA  Analysis.  
An analysis was performed to determine the impact of the power uprate on the PCT.  The PCT 
penalty was about 12'F, raising the PCT to 17730F, which is acceptable.-7-
Small  Break LOCA.  
The small break  LOCA analysis of  record  used a power  level  of 102%, thus, the conclusion  is 
acceptable  in this power uprate.  
Blowdown  Reactor Vessel and Loop Forces.  
The analysis of record includes a number of conservatisms  regarding the location of the break 
and the length of pipe to the break which determines the break discharge coefficient.  The 
licensee used the uprated power and removed the conservatisms, and thus demonstrated  that 
the hydraulic forcing functions remain valid.  The analysis is acceptable.  
Post LOCA Long  Term Core Cooling.  
The current analysis indicates that the  reactor will remain shut down  by borated emergency 
core cooling systems (ECCS) water in the reactor sump following  a LOCA.  The power uprate 
parameters do not impact this determination,  therefore,  the conclusion  is still valid.  
Hot Leg Switchover.  
The analysis  of record used 102%  power, therefore,  the analysis bounds the proposed power 
uprate and is acceptable.  
Trip Points and Time Delay to Trip.  
The following  non-LOCA  transients were analyzed  using statistical methods.  The only 
quantities modified  here are the power  level and the feedwater flow uncertainty.  Analyses were 
performed using 101.4% power (with  respect to the present power level) and 0.6% feedwater 
flow uncertainty.  It was determined  that the Over-Temperature-Delta  Temperature  (OTAT) and 
the Over-Pressure-Delta  Temperature  (OPAT) setpoints did  not need to be modified to 
accommodate the power level increase  with the new uncertainty.  For transients where  the 
minimum departure from nucleate  boiling  ratio (DNBR)  is the acceptance  criterion, the 
uncertainty is accounted for in the DNBR.  The analysis  is performed  to assure that the 
transient  DNBR value  is greater than the design value.  
Uncontrolled  Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Bank Withdrawal  from  Subcritical.  
The objective  of this analysis is to demonstrate  that the DNBR remains above the 
minimum value.  The reactor  is tripped by the power range meter.  The power increase 
essentially does not affect the reactor trip, therefore, the analysis of record  is valid.  
Uncontrolled  RCCA Bank Withdrawal from Power.  
The existing  study was performed at 10%,  60% and  100% power assuming beginning 
and end of life core conditions.  The limiting  power level  was found to be the 60% 
power.  The existing high  neutron flux trip setpoint is set at 118% power.  The new 
evaluation established that the 60% power  level is still limiting, the power uprate has a 
negligible effect on the resulting DNBR  value and, therefore,  the 118% high flux trip is 
adequate.  The NRC staff concludes that the analysis of record is valid.-8-
RCCA Misalignment. 
Partial and Complete  Loss of Forced  Reactor Coolant Flow.  
Loss of  External Electrical  Load and/or Turbine  Trip.  
Excessive  Heat Removal Due to Feedwater System  Malfunctions.  
Accidental  Depressurization  of the RCS.  
Inadvertent  Operation of the ECCS.  
Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked  Rotor.  
Steam  Line Break at Power with  Coincident Rod Withdrawal.  
For the above transients, reanalysis showed that the  minimum  DNBR value  is higher 
than the design value.  Therefore, we conclude that the analysis of record  is valid and is 
acceptable.  
Excessive Load  Increase.  
A rapid steam flow will cause a mismatch between core power and the SG load 
demand.  Evaluations  were performed  with and without  rod control at the beginning and 
end of cycle life.  In  this evaluation,  plant conditions  with conservative and bounding 
power deviations were compared to the  conditions required  to exceed the DNBR  limit.  It 
was found that the  minimum DNBR values remained  above the limit.  Therefore,  the 
analysis of record  is valid and is acceptable.  
Single RCCA Withdrawal  at Full  Power.  
This transient  is a subset of the  RCCA withdrawal,  except that  in this case the local 
power peak could be higher.  This is due to the fact that the same  OTAT signal  will trip 
the reactor.  Analysis shows that the  rods expected to experience  DNB are fewer than 
the allowed  limit.  Therefore,  the FSAR  analysis of  record is valid.  
2.7  Non-LOCA Transient Analyses  Employing  a 2% Calorimetric  Uncertainty 
The following  transients have been analyzed utilizing  102%  of current  nominal power level 
which is the same as the proposed power  uprate level  including  the 0.6% uncertainty.  
0  Startup of an inactive reactor coolant loop 
*  Loss of external electrical load and/or turbine trip overpressure analysis 
*  Loss of normal feedwater 
*  Inadvertent operation  of ECCS overfill analysis 
*  Major rupture  of a main feedwater  pipe, 102%  power case 
*  Single  reactor coolant pump locked rotor, overpressure,  maximum clad temperature, 
and maximum zirconium/water  reaction.
*  Rupture of a CRDM  housing,  102% power case.-9-
For the  above transients the analysis of record  is not affected and remains valid.  For the 
CRDM housing  rupture  in particular, the staff is  in the process of revising the transient peak 
energy deposition  of 280 cal/gm  which  is listed  in the current standard review plan.  In a letter to 
the Advisory Committee on  Reactor Safeguards  (Ref.  4)  the staff stated that it does not intend 
to backfit existing limits unless a licensee proposes an increase  in the fuel burnup limits.  This is 
not the case with WBN,  therefore, the current limits are acceptable.  
Uncontrolled  Boron  Dilution.  
This analysis assures that there  is sufficient time for operator action  before loss of shutdown 
margin occurs and is applicable  only to operating  modes  1 and 2.  The parameters  involved in 
this determination,  i.e.,  RCS active volume, dilution flowrate and critical  boron concentration  are 
not affected by the power uprate, therefore, the analysis of record is acceptable.  
Accidental Depressurization  of the  Main  Steam System and/or Rupture  of a Main  Steam  Line.  
Depressurization  or a main steam line break could produce  RCS overcooling  which could result 
in a power excursion.  The most conservative analysis  is carried out at zero power, thus, it is 
not affected by the proposed  power uprate.  The analysis  of record  is applicable and 
acceptable.  
2.8  Reactor Trip and Engineered  Safety Feature Actuation  System  (ESFAS) Setpoints 
The parameters which affect ESFAS are: SG pressure, steam flow and SG water level  high
high and low-low level settings.  However, the change  in SG pressure has no effect  on the 
narrow.range  SG low-low and  high-high trip setpoints.  The maximum  fluid velocity effect occurs 
at about 80% thermal  power, therefore,  the  1.4% thermal power  uprate does not affect the 
water level  high-high turbine  trip.  The SG pressure effect on SG water level  high-high and low
low turbine  trip setpoint is unaffected  by the  1.4% power uprate because the limiting case is 
determined  by the 0%  power case.  
2.9  Revised Thermal  Design  Procedure Uncertainty  Calculations 
The licensee states that these uncertainties were reanalyzed or reevaluated for the  1.4% 
thermal power increase and the 0.6% power uncertainty and showed that the changes had a 
negligible effect on the reactor setpoint uncertainties.  The result is reasonable and is 
acceptable.  
Power Calorimetric Uncertainty 
TVA states that the probability of exceeding the rated power with the old instrumentation  and 
associated  uncertainties is higher than with the proposed  LEFM at the higher power level and 
lower flow uncertainty.  An important new feature is that LEFM systems can continuously 
self-check for proper system operation and the validity of LEFM measurements.  Therefore, the 
staff finds that the LEFM design is an acceptable improvement over the previous design and 
the low calorimetric uncertainty associated with the proposed uprate is acceptable.-10-
2.10  BOP 
TVA performed  a heat balance at 101.4% power and examined the BOP systems which are 
affected, i.e.,  steam  extraction, condensate,  heater drains and vents, condensate  polishing, 
turbine/generator cooling,  condensate  circulating water and secondary sampling.  Review of the 
results showed  that the BOP  is adequate for the proposed uprate.  The reason is that the  plant 
was sized for 104% of the current rated power.  Therefore, the NRC staff finds the BOP 
adequate  and acceptable for the proposed power uprate.  
2.11  Reactor Systems - Summary and Conclusions 
The staff concludes, as discussed  in the sections above, that the licensee has demonstrated 
that the proposed power uprate will not significantly  affect the existing  reactor systems related 
margins of safety and that the  proposed WBN power uprate satisfies the current plant design 
basis.  Accordingly,  in this context, the staff finds TVA's request for a license amendment to 
permit operation at 3459 MWt to be acceptable.  
3.0  MATERIALS  ENGINEERING 
Introduction 
The  staff has evaluated TVA's June 7, August 24 and November 16,  2000 submittals to 
determine  whether or not the proposed  licensing action would  reduce the  margins of safety that 
have been established  in the licensing basis to ensure the structural  integrity of the WBN 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and in particular to  ensure the integrity  of the reactor 
pressure vessel (RPV),  SGBD system, SG tubes and CVCS.  
In  TVA's submittals, the  effects of the WBN power  uprate on the  RPV were assessed.  TVA 
evaluated the integrity of the  RPV at the revised design conditions in  terms of impact due to the 
neutron fluence.  As discussed  in the following sections, TVA provided an assessment on the 
impact of the power uprate on whether the maximum RPV fatigue usage factors remain  below 
1.0, the current  RPV  surveillance withdrawal schedule,  the existing heat-up and cool-down 
pressure-temperature  limit curves, the pressurized  thermal shock (PTS) evaluation,  and the 
emergency response guideline (ERG)  limits.  
In its submittals, TVA also assessed the effects  of the power uprate on the integrity of the WBN 
RCS,  CVCS, RHR system, spent  pool cooling,  condensate and feedwater system, SGBD 
system, SG tubes, the CRDM, the reactor coolant loop piping and supports.-11  -
3.1  NSSS Components 
3.1.1  Licensee  Evaluation 
3.1.1.1  Reactor Vessel 
TVA  evaluated the impact of the 1.4% power uprate on the RPV from several standpoints.  
For the fatigue analysis  of the RPV, the applicant concluded that the vessel outlet temperature 
will increase  from 618.70F to 619.1 'F,  and the range  of the vessel  inlet temperature  is slightly 
reduced with the 1.4% power uprate (5570F to 557.3°F versus 5570F to 557.7°F) as compared 
to the current configuration.  The applicant concluded that the current reactor vessel stress 
reports  remain applicable  due to the slight reduction  in inlet temperature  range.  For the vessel 
outlet nozzles, the applicant concluded that the maximum stress ranges and the maximum 
cumulative fatigue  usage factors are negligibly  affected by the 0.40F increase  in outlet 
temperature, with the maximum fatigue usage factors  remaining  below 1.0 with  the 1.4% power 
uprate.  
Regarding  neutron irradiation  of the RPV, the  1.4% power uprate can affect the neutron flux 
incident on the RPV wall  and the temperature  of the  RPV during operation,  both of which can 
affect the level of neutron  embrittlement  of the RPV.  Current analyses for WBN assume that 
the  inlet temperature  is between 5300F and 590 0F;  this assumption  is maintained with the 
decrease of  inlet temperature to 557.3°F due to the  1.4% power uprate.  
The applicant stated that the  existing fast neutron  fluence projection for the RPV bounds that 
projected for the 1.4% power uprate case, due to the use of low leakage cores beginning  with 
Cycle 2.  In  response to a request for additional  information,  the best estimate neutron fluence 
at 32 effective full  power years (EFPY) was reduced from the current value of 3.38 x  1019 
neutrons/cm2 (E  >  1 MeV) to a 1.4%  power uprate value  of 2.12 x  10' 9 neutrons/cm 2 
(E > 1 MeV).  Therefore, the applicant concluded that the current surveillance  withdrawal 
schedule, the existing  heat-up and cool-down  pressure-temperature  limit curves,  PTS 
evaluation,  ERG limits, and Charpy upper shelf energy values  all remain valid and applicable for 
the 1.4% power uprate case.  
Regarding the Charpy upper shelf energy requirements  of Appendix G to  10 CFR Part 50, TVA 
proposed, by letter dated November  16, 2000, a license condition which will compel TVA to 
perform supplemental fracture toughness testing (J-R curve) on specimens  removed from 
surveillance capsules W and X.  This supplemental testing  is intended  to provide validation of 
the equivalent margins analysis, submitted on October 15,  1993, to demonstrate  compliance 
with the requirements of Appendix G  to 10 CFR Part 50.  This license condition  requires the 
submittal of the results of the testing of the specimens from capsule W  (removed during the fall 
2000 outage), and an evaluation of the effects of the supplemental fracture toughness data on 
TVA's equivalent margins analysis,  in accordance with the requirements of Appendix  H to 
10 CFR Part 50, 12 months from withdrawal  of the capsule.  Capsule X is scheduled to be 
removed during the  Cycle 5 refueling outage.-12-
3.1.1.2 Reactor Internals 
The applicant assessed the impact of the  1.4%  power uprate  on thermal and  hydraulic, 
mechanical,  and structural  evaluations of the reactor vessel internals  (RVI)  at WBN.  As 
affected by the 1.4%  power uprate, the operational  parameters  that impact the RVI  are the 
changes  in  RCS temperature,  core and bypass flow,  neutron flux, and nuclear heating rates.  
The thermal and hydraulic evaluations  included core bypass flow calculation,  RCCA drop time 
analysis, hydraulic  lift forces, and baffle joint momentum  flux and fuel rod stability.  The 
applicant determined that the core bypass flow remains less than the current design value.  The 
applicant determined that the RCCA drop time would remain within  the TS requirement of 
2.7 seconds.  The applicant determined that the  reactor internal hold-down spring would 
maintain a net clamping force with the 1.4% power uprate,  and the reactor internals would 
remain seated and stable.  Regarding baffle joint momentum flux and fuel rod stability, the 
applicant determined  that operation  at the revised design  conditions would have a negligible 
effect on the momentum  flux and, therefore,  would not significantly affect fuel rod stability.  
For the  mechanical evaluations, the applicant focused  on flow and pump-induced  vibration, 
since the revised design conditions do not affect the  current design  basis for seismic and LOCA 
loads.  The applicant  found that the changes  in flow forces, resulting from changes  in fluid 
densities with  changes  in  THOT and TcOLD. were  insignificant when compared  to the current 
design temperature  ranges.  Thus, the applicant concluded that the mechanical  loads are not 
affected by the  1.4% power uprate.  
The structural  evaluations performed  by the applicant looked  at the baffle-barrel  region, the 
lower core plate, and the upper core plate.  For the baffle-barrel  region, the  applicant assessed 
the impact of changes  in the RCS fluid temperatures and gamma heating rates.  The applicant 
found that the existing structural analysis was still bounding for the  1.4%  power uprate because 
the gamma heating  rates and thermal assumptions bound those for the  1.4% power uprate.  
For the upper and  lower core plates, the applicant found that the changes in thermal  loads 
resulting from changes  in  RCS fluid temperatures  and gamma heating result in the fatigue 
usage being  maintained less than 1.0 with the 1.4%  power uprate, and the plates are 
structurally adequate under these conditions.  
3.1.2  Staff Evaluation 
3.1.2.1  Reactor Vessel 
Based on its review of the applicant's findings, the staff concludes that many of the existing 
RPV-related evaluations and analyses remain valid and applicable for the 1.4% power uprate.  
This conclusion  is based on minimal changes in vessel inlet and outlet temperatures  (0.40F) 
and the best estimate neutron  fluence for the 1.4% power uprate being  lower than the current 
docketed value for WBN.  The staff finds that the following specific evaluations and analyses 
are reasonable  and acceptable:  the maximum RPV fatigue usage factors remaining  below  1.0, 
the current surveillance withdrawal schedule, the existing heat-up and cool-down  pressure
temperature  limit curves, the PTS evaluation,  and the ERG limits.-13-
Regarding compliance  with the Charpy upper shelf energy requirements of Appendix G  to 
10 CFR Part 50, WBN  is expected to be in compliance  with these requirements (e.g., by all 
RPV materials exhibiting  no less than 50 ft-lb Charpy upper shelf energy) through at least 8.6 
EFPY.  To justify operation through end-of-license, the  NRC previously approved  an equivalent 
margins analysis, provided for in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, in  Supplement No.  14 to 
NUREG-0847,  "Safety Evaluation  Report  related to the operation  of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 
Units 1 and 2."  As described  in this NUREG, the staff's acceptance of the equivalent  margins 
analysis was conditioned on the  applicant (TVA) determining the actual fracture resistance of 
the  limiting WBN material through supplemental fracture toughness testing of specimens 
included  in the WBN reactor vessel surveillance program.  By letter dated November  16,  2000, 
TVA  proposed a license condition which will require TVA to perform supplemental fracture 
toughness testing (J-R curve) on specimens  removed from surveillance  capsules W and X.  
This supplemental testing  is intended to provide validation  of the equivalent margins analysis, 
submitted on October  15,  1993, to demonstrate  compliance with the  requirements of Appendix 
G to 10 CFR Part 50 through end-of-license for WBN.  The staff concludes that this license 
condition,  now identified as condition  number 2.C(5) in  Facility Operating  License  NPF-90, is 
sufficient to ensure that WBN will  remain  in compliance  with the Charpy upper shelf energy 
requirements  of Appendix G to  10 CFR Part 50, through end-of-license  conditions including  the 
1.4%  power uprate.  
3.1.2.2  Reactor Internals 
The staff finds that the applicant's various calculations, analyses and evaluations demonstrate 
that the RVIs  will perform their intended design functions  with the 1.4% power uprate.  The 
basis for this finding  is that (a) the changes  in operational design conditions necessary to 
implement the 1.4% power increase are bounded  by previously existing design assumptions, or 
(b) the changes  in operational  design  conditions result in an  insignificant effect on the loading  of 
the affected components  and thus continue to satisfy the appropriate design criteria.  
3.1.2.3 Leak Before  Break 
In Section 5.4 of the licensee's application,  the licensee assessed whether the  revised 
conditions resulting from a  1.4% power uprate would adversely effect the leak-before-break 
(LBB)  status of the reactor coolant  loop and pressurizer surge  line piping.  The licensee 
concluded that, "the revised design  conditions had a negligible effect on [the]  LBB conclusions." 
Based on the condition changes identified  in the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff finds that 
no modification to the LBB status of the main coolant loop and pressurizer surge line piping  is 
required as a result  of the Watts' Bar power uprate.  
3.2  SGs 
3.2.1  Evaluation  of SG Tube Degradation  Mechanisms 
WBN uses four Westinghouse Model  D3 SGs.  The SG tubing is made of mill-annealed  Alloy 
600 and has full-depth  hardroll  expansion joints in the tubesheet.  The tube support plate is 
made of carbon steel with a drilled hole configuration.  The tube has a nominal outside diameter 
of 0.75 inch with a nominal wall thickness  of 0.043 inch.-14-
Two parameters that will change slightly because of power uprate are system temperature  and 
primary-to-secondary  differential pressure.  After power uprate,  Thot  will be increased from 
618.7 0F to 619.1 OF.  The pressure for the  primary system  is unchanged at 2250 psi after the 
power uprate.  The steam pressure  in the secondary side will be  reduced slightly from 958 psi 
to 947 psi.  This reduction will cause the primary-to-secondary  pressure differential  to increase 
from  1292 psi to 1303  psi.  
For tube degradation,  Thot  is considered  to be a sensitive operating  parameter with respect to 
corrosion of  SG tubing.  The licensee presented industry data on  the correlation  of the Thot  and 
the degradation  rate for Alloy 600 tubing.  The data show that as Thot increases, the tube 
degradation  rate  increases.  On the  basis of the  correlation,  the staff finds that the licensee's 
conclusion that an  increase of 0.4 0F in  Thot  will  have a negligible  impact on tube degradation  is 
acceptable.  
With respect to tubing  in the preheater region, an increase  in  main feedwater flow may affect 
the tube wear in the preheater.  The licensee stated that the  increased feedwater flow rate is 
within the designed flow rate and the increase  in feedwater  flow under the power uprate 
conditions will  not affect the preheater wear.  With  respect to the tube wear at the anti-vibration 
bars, the licensee stated that if the  steam flow is increased significantly  (i.e.,  more than 5%) 
and the steam pressure  is decreased  significantly  (i.e.,  more than  100 psi), the tube wear at the 
anti-vibration bars would  be affected.  Under the power  uprate, the steam flow will increase  less 
than 5% and the steam pressure  will decrease  less than  100 psi.  These changes are within  the 
above mentioned  limits; therefore, the power uprate  will  have a negligible impact on the tube 
wear at the anti-vibration  bars.  
With respect to tube inspection,  the licensee stated that the  1.4%  power uprate  has not affected 
the degradation  assessment;  therefore, the licensee  will  not change the inspection  plan for the 
upcoming outage.  The licensee stated that future inspection plans will be determined  by active 
degradation,  potential degradation,  industry experience,  and plant-specific operating 
experience.  Under industry initiative  NE197-06,  SG Program Guidelines,  the licensee will 
perform  condition monitoring  and operational assessments each refueling  outage to assess 
continuing compliance  with structural  and leakage integrity criteria.  
The staff concludes that the changes  in system temperature and pressure as a result of the.  
power uprate are not expected to be significant  with respect to degradation by corrosion, 
preheater wear, anti-vibration  bar wear, and do not warrant any immediate changes to the tube 
inspection program.  
3.2.2  Tube Plugging and  Repair Criteria 
The current  plugging  limit for tube degradation  in the WBN TS is 40% of the wall thickness.  In 
general, tubes are plugged on detection.  Any detected tube indication for degradation by 
thinning or wear that is less than 40% through wall is allowed to remain in service  in accordance 
with the TS.  Both of these degradation  types can be bound by uniform wall-thinning 
calculations.  The licensee  performed wall-thinning calculations for degraded tubing in 
accordance with  Regulatory Guide  1.121,  which specifies that the tube should maintain a safety 
margin of three under the primary-to-secondary  pressure differential  under normal  operating 
conditions.  The licensee's calculations showed that the plugging limit of 40% for tube-15-
degradation  is conservative under the pressure loading  of 3903 psi (three times the pressure 
differential)  in the power uprate condition.  
The staff concludes  that the existing 40% plugging  limit for tube degradation  in the WBN  TS is 
adequate for the power uprate conditions.  
3.2.3  Evaluation  of Alternate  Repair Criterion  (ARC) 
In  FOL Amendment  No. 27, dated September  8, 2000, the NRC staff approved the F-star ARC 
for potential SG tube degradation  occurring in  the roll expanded  portion of the tube within  the 
tubesheet.  The  F-star criterion specifies that a length of tube, of an F-star distance,  shall be 
defect-free  to maintain the structural and leakage  integrity of the tube within  the tubesheet.  The 
F-star distance  is calculated,  in  part, using loading from the primary-to-secondary  pressure 
differential.  The WBN  F-star distance was calculated  using a primary-to-secondary  differential 
pressure of 1400 psi.  The differential pressure is 1303 psi under power uprate, which  is 
bounded by 1400 psi.  The  F-star distance will not be changed; therefore, the F-star criteria will 
not be affected  under power uprate conditions.  
The staff concludes that the power uprate  will have a negligible effect on  the F-star criterion  for 
SG tubes.  
3.3  NSSS Fluid Systems 
3.3.1  RCS 
The small magnitude  of the temperature changes associated with the  power uprate are 
insufficient  to cause a significant change  in the chemistry  of this system.  Therefore, the power 
uprate does not affect the chemistry  of this system.  
3.3.2  CVCS 
The main role of the CVCS is to maintain  reactor coolant (RCS) water inventory,  boron 
concentration and  primary water chemistry control.  To perform these functions the maximum 
expected  cold leg  coolant temperature after core thermal  power uprate should be less than or 
equal to the applicable  CVCS design temperature and less than or equal  to the heat exchanger 
design inlet operating temperature.  The former criterion supports the functional operability of 
the CVCS and the latter serves to verify that the heat exchanger design conditions  remain 
bounding.  
The licensee's analysis has indicated that after the proposed core thermal power uprate, cold 
leg temperature will  be 557.30F.  This value is below the CVCS inlet and  the heat exchanger 
shell side inlet design temperatures,  which are 560°F and 6500 F, respectively.  Also, the 
excess letdown  path used for processing  excess effluent caused by fluid expansion during plant 
heatup is not affected by the revised cold leg temperature because, during power operation, 
desired outlet temperature can be maintained by throttling its letdown  heat exchanger outlet 
flow.  The licensee concluded,  therefore, that none of the functions of CVCS will be affected by 
the proposed  thermal power uprate.  The staff finds the licensee's evaluation  acceptable.-16-
3.3.3  Residual Heat Removal  System 
3.3.4  Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 
3.3.5  Condensate and Feedwater System 
The small  magnitude of the temperature  changes associated with the power uprate are 
insufficient to cause a significant change  in the chemistry of these systems.  Therefore,  the 
power uprate does not affect the chemistry of this system.  
3.3.6  SGBD System 
The SGBD  is used to control chemical  composition and buildup of solids in the secondary SG 
water.  In WBN,  the SGBD system can  handle blowdown  rates from 5 gpm to 65.5  gpm per SG.  
The actual  blowdown  rates during  power operation are determined  by secondary water 
chemistry and by the need for controlling solid buildups on SG tubesheets.  Both these 
parameters are a function of the  amount of  inleaking  impurities into the secondary water.  Since 
the  rate at which it occurs is independent of reactor power, water chemistry will  remain within 
the specified  limits and the  SGBD rates will  not be affected.  In its evaluation,  the licensee 
indicated that since the proposed NSSS operating plant parameters permit a variation  of the full 
load steam pressure to 947  psia, the inlet pressure to the  SGBD and sampling  system can also 
vary accordingly.  Also, the licensee found that the SGBD control valve is adequate for the 
design blowdown  flow rate at the  reduced full  load SG pressure.  Based on these findings, the 
licensee concluded that the performance  of the SGBD system  will  not be impacted by the core 
thermal  power uprate.  The  NRC staff reviewed  the licensee's evaluation and finds it to be 
acceptable.  
3.4 Staff  Conclusion 
Based on the  information discussed above, the NRC staff has concluded that the issues 
regarding  the integrity and operation  of the  RPV,  RCS, CVCS, RHR  system, spent pool cooling, 
condensate  and feedwater system, SGBD system, SG tubes, the CRDM, the reactor coolant 
loop piping and supports have been adequately addressed  in the TVA submittals,  and that the 
proposed  power uprate  to 3459 MWt is acceptable  in these respects.  
4.0  EVALUATION  - MECHANICAL  ENGINEERING 
The TVA  submittal of June 7, 2000, contains a safety analysis  in Enclosure  1, in support of the 
proposed plant operations  at a core power  level of  up to 3459 MWt.  TVA indicated that its 
submittal contained the plant-specific  information  that follows the guidelines of Westinghouse 
Topical  Report, WCAP-10263,  "A Review Plan for Uprating the Licensed  Power of a 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)."  This report has not been reviewed and approved  by the 
NRC; however, it has been referenced by other Westinghouse  PWR plants  in their requests  for 
core power uprate.  By letter dated August 24, 2000,  TVA provided supplemental  plant-specific 
information  in response to the staff's requests for additional  information.  
The NRC staff reviewed the WBN  power uprate amendment, as it relates to the effects  of the 
power uprate  on the structural and pressure boundary integrity  of the NSSS and BOP systems.  
Affected components in these systems included  piping, in-line equipment and pipe supports, 
the RPV,  core support structures (CSS), RVI,  SG, CRDM,  reactor coolant pumps, and-17-
pressurizer.  The staff's safety evaluation (SE) concerning  the effects of the power uprate  on 
the pertinent components  is provided below.  
4.1  Reactor Vessel 
The proposed power uprate will increase  power approximately  1.4%  over the currently licensed 
level of 3411  MWt  in core power.  TVA reported that the power increase  will result in changing 
the design parameters given  in Table 2-1,  Enclosure  1 of  its June 7, 2000 submittal.  Table 2-1 
provides a comparison  of the current design parameters  and the corresponding  revised 
parameters for use  in the power uprate analysis at WBN.  
TVA evaluated the reactor vessel  for the effects of the revised design  conditions  in Table 2-1  on 
the most limiting vessel locations with regard to ranges of stress intensity and fatigue 
cumulative usage factors (CUFs) in each of the regions, as identified  in the reactor vessel 
stress reports.  The evaluations considered the operating parameters which were identified for 
the uprated power condition.  The regions of the reactor vessel  affected by the power uprate 
include outlet and inlet nozzles, the  RPV (main closure  head flange, studs, and vessel flange), 
CRDM  housing, bottom  head to shell juncture, core support pads and the instrumentation 
tubes.  The licensee evaluated the maximum  ranges of stresses and cumulative fatigue usage 
factors for the critical components  at the core power uprated conditions.  The evaluation was 
performed  in accordance  with the ASME Boiler and Pressure  Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section  III, 
1971  Edition,  with addenda through the Winter  1971  to assure compliance with  the code of 
record.  
The calculated  maximum stresses and the maximum CUFs for the reactor vessel critical 
locations are  provided  in  Enclosure 2 of the August 24, 2000 submittal.  The results indicate 
that the maximum  stresses are within the allowable  limits, and the CUFs  remain below the 
ASME Code limit of  1.0.  The licensee concluded that the current design  of the reactor vessel 
continues to be in compliance  with licensing  basis codes and standards for the power uprate 
condition.  Based on  its review, the NRC staff finds this conclusion acceptable.  
4.2  Reactor CSS and Vessel  Internals 
TVA's submittal of August 24, 2000, provided the additional  information  requested  by the staff 
with  regard to the evaluation  of the reactor vessel core support and internal structures.  The 
limiting reactor internal components  evaluated include the lower core plate, core barrel,  baffle 
plate, baffle/barrel  region bolts, and the upper core plate.  The licensee indicated  that because 
the reactor internal components were not licensed to the ASME  B&PV Code, the evaluation  is 
in compliance  with the design criteria as documented  in the WBN  FSAR.  However, the lower 
core structural integrity was evaluated  in the August 24, 2000 submittal  in accordance  with the 
1989  Edition  of the ASME Section  III Code.  This is in accordance with  10 CFR 50.55a and is 
acceptable.  
TVA evaluated these  critical reactor internal components considering the revised design 
conditions provided  in Table 2-1  of the June 7, 2000 submittal.  The licensee  indicated that for 
the baffle-barrel  region and the upper core plate, the current structural and thermal analyses of 
record for WBN  remain bounding  for the power uprate condition.  Enclosure 2 of the August 24, 
2000 submittal  identifies the maximum calculated stress intensity and CUF for the lower core 
plates.  The calculated stress is less than the Code allowable  limit based on the 1989  Edition-18-
ASME Section  III Code.  The CUFs are less than the  limit of 1.0.  The remaining  reactor internal 
components  are less limiting.  In addition,  the potential  for the flow induced vibration does not 
increase for the  power uprate.  As a result of these evaluations,  the licensee concluded that the 
reactor internal components  at WBN  will  be structurally adequate for the proposed power 
uprate  conditions.  The NRC staff finds the licensee's assessment to be acceptable.  
4.3  CRDM 
The pressure  boundary portion  of the CRDM are those exposed to the vessel/core inlet fluid.  
TVA  evaluated the adequacy of the  CRDM  by reviewing the WBN current CRDM  design 
specifications and stress report to compare the design-basis  input parameters against the 
revised design conditions  in Table 2-1  of the June 7, 2000 submittal for the power uprate.  
Enclosure 2 of the August 24, 2000 submittal  identifies the applicable ASME  Code and results 
of the stress and fatigue evaluation  for the CRDM components.  TVA indicated that the Code 
used for the power uprate  evaluation  is the ASME  B&PV Code Section  III,  1971  Edition  through 
Winter 1972 Addenda,  which  is the Code  of record.  The  results indicate that CRDM 
components' stresses and CUFs for the proposed conditions  remain within the ASME  Code 
limits.  
On the basis of  its review,  the NRC staff finds acceptable the licensee's  conclusion that the 
current design  of CRDM  continues to be in compliance  with  licensing  basis codes and 
standards for the power uprated conditions.  
4.4  SGs 
The licensee reviewed the  existing structural and fatigue anajyses  of the SGs at WBN, and 
compared the power uprate conditions with the  design parameters  of the Model  D3 SG's stress 
reports.  The comparison  of key parameters is shown in Table 2-1  of the June 7, 2000 
submittal.  For evaluation  of the critical  SG components, the licensee incorporated  the  key input 
parameters  to develop scaling factors which  were used to calculate the stress and fatigue 
usage for the power uprate conditions.  The evaluation  was performed  in accordance  with the 
requirements  of the ASME Code, Section  III,  1971  Edition through the Summer  1972 
Addendum,  which is the Code of  record for SGs at WBN.  
The calculated  maximum stresses and cumulative fatigue usage factors for the critical  SG 
components are provided  in Table  1, Enclosure 7 of the June 7, 2000 submittal.  The  results 
indicate that the maximum calculated stresses are below the Code-allowable  limits except for 
the auxiliary feedwater nozzle where  the licensee performed a simplified elastic-plastic analysis 
per NB-3228.3 of the ASME Code.  The results provided  in Table  1 also show that the 
calculated  CUFs are within the allowable limit of unity for the 40 years service  life.  
On the basis of its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the 
maximum stresses and CUFs for the critical SG components are within the Code allowable 
limits and, therefore, are acceptable for the proposed  1.4% power uprate.  
4.5  Reactor Coolant Pumps 
The licensee  reviewed the existing design  basis analyses of the WBN reactor coolant pumps to 
determine  the impact of the  revised design conditions  in Table 2-1.  Enclosure 6 of the June 7,-19-
2000 submittal indicated that the applicable ASME Codes used in the evaluation are the same 
as the Code of record.  
After the core power  uprate, the reactor RCS pressure  remains unchanged.  The most limiting 
design parameter of the SG  outlet temperature, as provided  in Table 2-1  of the June 7, 2000 
submittal, was decreased  slightly from 557.5 to 557 'F  for the power uprate condition.  There 
are no significant changes to the design thermal transients.  As a result of the evaluation,  TVA 
indicated that the current stress and fatigue margins in  the stress reports for the WBN reactor 
coolant pumps are sufficient to accommodate  this small decrease in the  SG outlet temperature.  
On the basis of its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has shown that the current 
reactor coolant pumps, when operating  at the proposed conditions with  1.4% power increase 
from the current rated power, will remain  in compliance  with the requirements of the codes and 
standards under which the WBN were originally licensed.  
4.6  Pressurizer 
The licensee evaluated the structural adequacy  of the pressurizer and components for limiting 
locations at the pressurizer spray nozzle, the surge nozzle,  and upper shell for operation  at the 
uprated conditions.  The Code used in the evaluation  is the ASME Code, Section  III,  1971 
Edition,  through  Summer 1971  addenda, which  is the  Code of  record for WBN pressurizer.  The 
evaluation  was performed  by comparing the key parameters  in the current WBN pressurizer 
stress report against the revised design conditions in Table 2-1  for the  proposed power uprate.  
Table 2,  Enclosure 6 of the June 7, 2000 submittal provides the comparison of the current and 
uprated pressurizer design parameters.  The comparison  shows that the existing design basis 
analyses remain bounding for the proposed power uprate conditions.  The licensee concluded 
that the  existing pressurizer components  will  remain adequate for plant operation with the 
proposed  1.4%  power increase while the  RCS pressure remain unchanged.  The NRC staff 
finds that the  licensee's conclusion  is acceptable.  
4.7  NSSS Piping and Pipe  Supports 
The proposed  power uprate of WBN involves an increase  in the temperature difference across 
the RCS.  The licensee evaluated the NSSS piping and supports by reviewing the design basis 
analysis against the uprated  power condition, with  regards to the design system parameters, 
transients and the LOCA dynamic loads.  The evaluation was performed  for the reactor coolant 
loop piping, primary equipment nozzles, primary equipment supports, and the pressurizer surge 
line piping.  The methods, criteria and requirements used in the existing design basis analysis 
for WBN were used for the power uprate evaluation.  
The RCS pressure remains unchanged  for the proposed core power uprate.  The actual hot leg 
temperature for the power uprate is projected to be slightly greater than the hot leg temperature 
at the current rated power level.  The cold leg temperature  for the power uprate condition  will be 
less than that for the current power level.  The  licensee indicated that there is sufficient margin 
in the existing analysis for stresses associated  with the temperature changes defined in 
Table 2-1  of the June 7, 2000 submittal.  
The licensee  also indicated that the design transients used  in the evaluation of the RCS piping 
systems and equipment nozzles are unchanged for the WBN power uprate.  The loop hydraulic- 20  -
forces  will increase slightly due to the decrease  in the cold  leg temperature and the increase  in 
water density at the power uprate  condition.  The licensee indicated that the small increase  in 
LOCA loads for the power uprate  is offset by the model  improvement which reduces the  LOCA 
loads about  17%.  As such, the current  LOCA  hydraulic forcing  functions are bounding for the 
uprated power condition.  The licensee concluded that the existing stresses, fatigue usage 
factors and loads remain  bounding for the power uprate for the  NSSS components including the 
reactor cooling  loop piping, the primary equipment  nozzles, the primary equipment supports, 
pipe supports and the auxiliary equipment  (i.e. heat exchangers, pumps, valves and tanks).  
Therefore, these components will continue to be in compliance  with the Code of record at WBN 
Unit 1.  
On the basis of its review, the  NRC staff finds that the -licensee has shown that the existing 
NSSS piping and supports, the primary equipment  nozzles, the primary equipment supports, 
and the auxiliary  lines connecting to the primary loop piping  will remain  in compliance  with the 
requirements of the design bases criteria, as defined in the WBN  FSAR, and are, therefore, 
acceptable  for the power uprate.  
4.8  BOP Systems and  Motor-Operated  Valves  (MOVs) 
The licensee  evaluated the adequacy of the  BOP systems based on comparing  the existing 
design bases parameters  with the core  power uprate conditions.  The BOP  piping systems 
evaluated for the power uprate  are main steam,  feedwater, SGBD, auxiliary feedwater, 
extraction steam, heater drains, condensate, turbine plant cooling, secondary sampling, spent 
fuel  pool cooling,  RHR,  component cooling,  and station service water.  
The licensee  evaluated the affected  systems on the basis of the uprated  input parameters  in 
Table 2-1  (for RCS temperatures, and steam temperature  and steam flow rate) and the  heat 
balance  at 3459 MWt  reactor thermal power.  As a result, the licensee concluded that the 
existing  design basis analyses, using maximum differential temperatures and pressures for 
normal operation and worst-case conditions, for the BOP piping,  pipe supports, and 
components  remain bounding  for the uprated power level  of 3459 MWt at WBN.  
The licensee  also reviewed the  programs, components, structures, and non-NSSS system 
issues as they are affected by the power uprate.  In Enclosure  6 of the June 7, 2000 submittal, 
the  licensee stated that the there are no changes to the TVA MOV program as a result of the 
1.4% power uprate.  The safety related valves were  not found to be impacted by the 1.4% 
power uprate and are, therefore,  acceptable.  This determination was confirmed by verifying 
that changes  in system operating temperature, pressure and flow rate were bounded by the 
requirements of the associated  equipment specification.  As such, the increased thrust required 
to operate the MOVs due to expected differential pressure conditions is within  the capabilities  of 
the existing valve actuators.  Additionally,  In its response, dated August 24, 2000, the licensee 
assessed the impacts  of power uprate on the Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 MOVs  and the 
Limitorgue Technical Bulletin 98-01  update programs and found them to be acceptable.  
The  licensee reviewed the evaluation  of GL 95-07 associated  with the pressure locking and 
thermal  binding for valves listed in Table 2 of the August 24, 2000 submittal.  The licensee 
found that the existing analysis conditions remain bounding for the 1.4% power uprate.  The 
licensee reviewed the evaluation of TVA GL 96-06 program regarding the over-pressurization  of 
isolated  piping segments.  The licensee concluded that the existing evaluation for GL 96-06- 21  -
was performed at 102%  of 3411  M Wt and is therefore,  bounding for the proposed power 
uprate  of  101.4% rated power level.  On the basis of the above  review, the  NRC staff concurs 
with the licensee's conclusions that the power uprate  will have no adverse effects on the safety
related valves and that conclusions of the TVA GL 95-07, and  GL 96-06, as well as GL 89-10 
programs,  remain valid.  
As a result of the above  evaluation, the NRC staff concludes  that the BOP piping, pipe supports 
and equipment nozzles, and valves remain acceptable  and continue to satisfy the design-basis 
requirements  for the power uprate.  
4.9  Mechanical  Engineering  - Conclusion 
On the basis of  its review, the NRC staff finds the evaluations performed by the licensee for the 
NSSS and BOP piping, components,  and supports, the reactor vessel and internal components, 
the CRDM,  SGs, reactor coolant pumps and the pressurizer to be acceptable.  The licensee's 
evaluation  is bounded by the ASME  code of record  and the original  design basis.  Therefore, 
the staff concludes the foregoing components  are acceptable for WBN  uprate operations at the 
proposed  core power level of 3459 MWt.  
5.0  EVALUATION  - POWER SYSTEMS 
5.1  Introduction  and Background 
Nuclear power plants are licensed to operate at a specified core thermal power and the 
uncertainty of the calculated values of this thermal power determines the probability of 
exceeding the power levels assumed in the design  basis transient and accident analyses.  In 
this regard, Appendix  K to 10 CFR Part 50 requires  LOCA and  ECCS analyses to assume that 
the reactor. has been operating  continuously at a power level  at least 102.0%  of the licensed 
thermal power to  allow for uncertainties, such as instrument error.  The phrase "such as" 
suggests that the 2%  power margin was intended to address uncertainties  related to heat 
sources in  addition to the instrument measurement  uncertainties.  Later, the  NRC concluded 
that, at the time of the original  ECCS rulemaking,  the 2%  power margin requirement  appeared 
to be based solely on considerations  associated  with power measurement  uncertainty.  This 
regulation  did not require demonstration of the power measurement uncertainty and mandated 
a 2%  margin, notwithstanding that the instruments  may be more accurate.  Subsequent 
development of  higher accuracy instruments has enabled licensees to propose using 
instrumentation that would reduce the  uncertainties associated with measurement of reactor 
power.  This development could justify a  reduced margin between the licensed power level and 
the power level assumed  in the ECCS analysis and, therefore, a power uprate.  
The Caldon topical  report ER-80P calculated  thermal  power measurement uncertainties  using 
Chordal LEFM flow and temperature  measurements applicable to a two loop pressurized  water 
reactor (PWR) or a two feedwater line boiling water reactor (BWR).  Based on this calculation, 
the summary of the report stated that the LEFM is accurate to ±0.6% of thermal power, with 
95% confidence  limits, versus ±1.4% representative of current instrumentation.  Although the 
calculation results supported a maximum  1.4% thermal power uprate, the ER-80P topical report 
recommended  referencing  it for thermal  power uprates of only up to 1%.  The staff approved  a 
1% power uprate on September 30, 1999,  for Comanche Peak  Unit 2, which used the  Caldon 
LEFM.- 22 -
Subsequently, to reduce an unnecessarily burdensome  regulatory  requirement and to avoid 
unnecessary  exemption  requests, the Commission published the final rule in the June 1, 2000, 
Federal  Register,  allowing the licensees to justify a smaller margin for power measurement 
uncertainty.  The final  rule amends the Appendix K requirement and allows licensees the option 
of using values lower than 102%  of licensed power in the plant ECCS analyses or maintaining 
the current margin  of 2% power.  Licensees  may apply the reduced  margin to operate  the plant 
at a level higher than the previously licensed  power, as TVA proposed for WBN in its 
submittals, or use the margin to relax ECCS-related TSs.  
By letter dated June 7, 2000 TVA submitted a request to increase  the full-core thermal power 
rating of WBN by 1.4% from 3411  MWt  to 3459  MWt based on the use of the Caldon  LEFM.  
In addition  to referencing  the Caldon  ER-80P report, the TVA submittal included the Caldon 
engineering  report ER-1 60P, "Supplement to Topical  Report ER-80P: Basis for a Power Uprate 
with the  LEFM System," the Westinghouse  calculation, "Power Calorimetric Measurement 
Uncertainty Calculation for WBN  Unit 1 Power  Uprate," the TVA document, "Applicability of 
Comanche  Peak Unit 2 Questions to WBN Uprate," and a description and an evaluation of the 
proposed  changes. TVA's response to a staff request for additional  information was  provided  in 
a letter dated October 6, 2000 (Ref.  6), and the results of hydraulic laboratory calibration test of 
the WBN  LEFM were submitted  by a TVA letter dated October 27, 2000 (Ref.  7).  
The Caldon Topical  Report ER-80P,  "Improving  Thermal  Power Accuracy and Plant  Safety 
While Increasing Operating  Power Level Using the  LEFM System," together with its supplement 
ER-1 60P, provide the generic basis for increasing power  by up to 1.4%.  The other documents 
in Ref. 1, 6, and 7  provide additional  plant-specific  information for WBN to support the  proposed 
1.4%  power uprate.  The staff approved  topical  report ER-80P  in a safety evaluation  report 
(SER) dated  March 8,  1999.  The following is the NRC staff's evaluation  of supplemental topical 
report ER-160P and TVA's  plant-specific justification for the power uprate  of WBN  utilizing the 
improved  LEFM.  
5.2  Power Systems - Evaluation 
Neutron  flux  instrumentation  is calibrated to the core thermal power, which  is determined  by an 
automatic or manual calculation of the energy balance around the plant NSSS.  This calculation 
is called the "secondary calorimetric" for a PWR and the "heat balance" for a BWR.  The 
accuracy of this calculation depends primarily upon the accuracy of feedwater flow and 
feedwater net enthalpy measurements.  Thus, an accurate  measurement of feedwater flow and 
temperature  will  result in  an accurate  calibration of the nuclear instrumentation.  
The instrumentation for measuring feedwater flow typically use an orifice plate, a venturi meter, 
or a flow nozzle  to generate a differential pressure proportional to the feedwater velocity in the 
pipe.  Of the three differential pressure  devices, a venturi meter is most widely used for 
feedwater measurement in nuclear power plants.  The WBN design uses a venturi in the 
feedwater systems of each of the four SGs for feedwater measurement.  The major advantage 
of a venturi  meter is a relatively low head loss as the fluid passes through the device.  The 
major disadvantage  of the device  is fouling,  which causes the meter to indicate a higher 
differential  pressure and hence a higher than actual flow rate.  This leads the plant operator to 
calibrate  nuclear instrumentation high.  Calibrating the nuclear instrumentation  high is 
conservative  with respect to the reactor safety, but causes the electrical  output to be 
proportionally low when the plant  is operated at its thermal power rating.  To eliminate  the- 23  -
fouling effects, the flow device has to be removed, cleaned, and re-calibrated.  Due to the high 
cost of re-calibration  and the need  to improve flow instrumentation  uncertainty, the industry 
assessed other flow measurement techniques and found  LEFM  to be a viable alternative.  
The Caldon Chordal  LEFM is an ultrasonic flow meter, using acoustic energy pulses to 
determine the feedwater  mass flow rate. The meter is based  on time-of-flight (transit time or 
counter-propagation)  technology.  The transit time technology sends an ultrasonic signal 
diagonally through the fluid  and then measures the time it takes to travel  upstream and 
downstream.  The sound travels faster when the pulse traverses the pipe with the flow and 
slower when the pulse traverses the pipe against the flow. The difference  in these times is 
proportional  to the velocity of the fluid in the pipe.  The LEFM  uses these transient times and 
the  time differences  between  pulses to determine the fluid  velocity and temperature.  There are 
two designs of LEFMs.  One  is intrusive,  using  multiple chordal paths with transducers mounted 
on a spool and the other is a clamp-on  type, which straps on the feedwater pipe.  WBN 
currently uses a clamp-on  LEFM to measure feedwater flow and uses this measurement to 
correct  the fouling  effects of the venturi.  However, the accuracy and  repeatability of 
measurements  with this LEFM  is not high enough to justify power uprate.  
TVA proposes to operate an improved Caldon  LEFM system for feedwater flow measurement 
at WBN.  This system consists of  an electronic cabinet  in the auxiliary instrument room  and a 
measurement  section, or a spool piece.  The spool piece will be permanently installed  in the 32 
inch  line main feedwater header, replacing the existing  strap-on  LEFM.  The improved  LEFM  is 
a single digital system controlled  by software  using the ultrasonic transit time  method to 
measure four  line integral  velocities at precise locations with  respect to the pipe center line.  
The system numerically integrates the four measured velocities to determine the mass flow rate 
and the fluid temperature.  These measurements are used by the plant computer to determine 
the  reactor thermal  output.  TVA stated that, although  the system's function  is not  nuclear 
safety-related  (providing flow and temperature inputs only to the  calorimetric calculation),  the 
system's software has been developed  and will be maintained  under a verification and 
validation  (V&V) program.  The V&V program has been applied to all system software and 
hardware, and includes a detailed  code  review.  The LEFM  will significantly improve 
measurement accuracy, and measurement reliability,  and will allow on-line verification  of the 
accuracy of the feedwater flow and temperature measurements.  TVA  stated that it will continue 
to use venturi-based feedwater flow measurement for feedwater control and other functions that 
it is currently  used for.  The venturi-based  indication may be  periodically adjusted on the basis 
of the  LEFM indication as a backup to determine  calorimetric power when the LEFM  is not 
available.  
Caldon topical  report ER-80P (previously approved  by the staff) and its supplement ER-160P, 
specifically for WBN, describe the improved  LEFM system for the measurement of feedwater 
flow and temperature  to determine  reactor thermal  power and provide a basis for a 1.4% uprate 
of the licensed reactor power.  The topical report stated that the LEFM  is superior to the venturi
based instrumentation  currently in use on two counts: 
1.  The elements of  LEFM accuracy can be verified on-line, 
2.  The LEFM is demonstrably  more accurate.  The LEFM measurement  uncertainty is 
0.6% of thermal  power, with 95% confidence  limit, whereas the measurement 
uncertainty of the current instrumentation  is ±1.4%.- 24 -
The supplemental  topical  report  ER-1 60P, provides a justification  for a 1.4% power uprate  by 
using the Caldon LEFM system  to determine the plant thermal power.  This power uprate  is 
based on the  LEFM capability to measure reactor power with an  uncertainty of ±0.6% with  a 
95% confidence  level.  The report  lists the  contributions of individual  error elements and states 
that all errors and biases are calculated  and combined according  to the applicable  ASME 
standards referenced  in the staff-approved  topical report.  The assumptions and methodology 
of the calculation are the same as those used in the staff-approved Caldon topical  report 
ER-80P.  The calculated individual  error elements are listed in two separate tables: one for the 
existing  instrumentation  (venturi) and one for a chordal  LEFM system.  The calculation  of total 
power measurement uncertainty of the venturi and the LEFM  used the root sum square (RSS) 
method to combine the individual  error elements (various error elements related to LEFM, 
pressure and moisture instrument errors, and other gains and losses).  In this calculation,  the 
combined  total of the LEFM-related  error elements  is the largest contribution to the  power 
measurement uncertainty, and the profile factor (hydraulics-related  factors) of the  LEFM is the 
largest contributor to the LEFM-related  error.  The calculation  was done with two standard 
deviations  for a 95% confidence  level (probability  of operation within  bounds).  The calculation 
showed  the power measurement  uncertainty bounds of the venturi and the  LEFM as ±1.4% and 
±0.6%,  respectively, and 1-in-44 odds of exceeding the  high-side bound.  Caldon calculated 
these bounds, the probability of operation  within bounds, and the odds of exceeding  the high
side bound for up to five standard deviations for both the venturi  and the  LEFM.  The results are 
listed in Table 3 of the  report.  Those results were used to develop graphs to compare the 
probability of exceeding  reactor thermal  power for a plant operating at 100% of  its licensed 
thermal  power (LTP),  using  a venturi to measure feedwater  flow, and the probability for a plant 
operating  at the power uprate,  using an LEFM.  The graphs indicate that the probability  of 
exceeding the analyzed  power level  of 102%  is the same with the current instrumentation for a 
plant operating at 100%  of LTP as for the plant using an LEFM and operating at 101.4% of the 
LTP.  Additionally, the  LEFM continuously verifies that it is operating within  its design bounds, 
whereas the current instrumentation has no such feature, and no indication  of thermal power 
measurement accuracy is available  to the plant operator.  Because of this feature,  the report 
concludes that use of the LEFM  increases safety.  Also, since the  LEFM display indicates the 
value as well as the validity of the thermal  power measurement at the same location in the main 
control  room, the operator can use the display to  maintain reactor power at or below the 
licensed thermal  power rating.  For example, an  audible alarm tells  the operatorwhen  the 
LEFM  is not operating  within its design basis accuracy.  The report  includes a table listing 
sustained overpower events above 102%  of licensed thermal  power during  1982 through  1994 
that could have been averted if on-line verification and control  room indication  of thermal power 
and its measurement accuracy had been available.  The staff review of the supplemental  topical 
report  ER-1 60P found the estimates of total power measurement uncertainty of the Caldon 
improved  LEFM and the justification for referencing this topical report for a 1.4%  power uprate 
to be acceptable.  
The staff SER on Caldon topical report ER-80P  included four additional criteria to be addressed 
by a licensee  requesting a power uprate.  In  Ref.  1, TVA addressed each  of the four criteria as 
follows: 
1.  The licensee should discuss the maintenance and calibration procedures that will 
be implemented with  the incorporation of the LEFM.  These procedures should 
include processes and contingencies  for an inoperable LEFM and the effect on 
thermal power measurement and plant operation.- 25 -
In Enclosure  12 of Ref.  1, TVA states that the LEFM  installation will  include 
implementation  of the necessary procedures and documents  required for operation, 
maintenance,  testing, and training at the uprated  power level.  The WBN preventive 
maintenance  program  will include  LEFM  calibration and maintenance.  All adverse 
conditions that are identified  will be documented  in accordance  with the WBN 
corrective  action  program.  It is further stated that WBN will address the operability 
requirements for the LEFM system,  including the appropriate  actions to be taken 
when the  LEFM is unavailable.  The LEFM operability requirements  will be  included 
in the WBN Technical Requirements  Manual  (TRM).  The  LEFM software  will  be 
maintained  under Caldon's  V&V program with a requirement that Caldon will  notify 
WBN of any deficiency that could affect the design basis accuracy of the LEFM.  
The  NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation  and for 
subsequent  evaluation of proposed changes  pertaining to the above regulatory 
commitments  are provided  by the licensee's administrative processes,  including  its 
commitment  management program.  Three examples are as follows: (1) TVA has 
provided three commitments  in Enclosure  12 of its submittal of June 7, 2000 
related to the implementation  of LEFM procedures,  LEFM operability  requirements 
and LEFM  related changes to the FSAR.  (2) As stated on page E6-24 of TVA's 
June 7, 2000 submittal, the  LEFM is designed as a quality related system, which 
means that the system  is within the scope of the WBN  Quality Assurance  Program 
pursuant to Appendix B of  10 CFR Part 50.  (3) As noted in  FSAR section  16, 
changes to the TRM are evaluated in accordance  with  10 CFR 50.59.  Therefore,  in 
consideration  of these factors, the NRC staff has determined  that the commitments 
do not warrant the creation of  regulatory requirements which would  require prior 
NRC approval of subsequent changes.  
2.  For plants that currently have LEFM installed, the licensee  should provide an 
evaluation  of the operational and maintenance  history of the installation  and 
confirm that the installed instrumentation  is representative  of the  LEFM system and 
bounds the analysis and assumptions  set forth  in topical report ER-80P.  
*  WBN currently  uses the  LEFM 8300 strap-on system for correcting the venturi 
fouling effects.  The new improved  LEFM  is a replacement,  not a representative  of 
8300 strap-on type LEFM,  and will be bounded  by the assumptions and analysis 
set forth in topical  report ER-80P and its supplement, ER-160P.  
3.  The licensee should confirm that the methodology used to calculate the uncertainty 
of the LEFM  in comparison to the current feed water instrumentation  is based on 
accepted  plant setpoint methodology  (with regard  to the development  of instrument 
uncertainty).  If an alternate methodology  is used, the application should be justified 
and applied to both venturi and ultrasonic flow measurement instrumentation 
installation for comparison.  
In Ref.  1, TVA states that Westinghouse  Topical Reports WCAP-14738, 
"Westinghouse Revised Thermal Design Procedure  Instrumentation  Uncertainty 
Methodology," and WCAP-1 2096, 'Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for 
Protection System," provide the RCS control system uncertainties  and the reactor-26  -
trip system  (RTS) and  ESFAS trip setpoints used in  the plant safety analysis.  The 
TVA further states  in Ref.  2 that each  of the two reports are applicable to WBN and 
that, WCAP-14738,  Revision  0, and WCAP-12096, Revision  7, were reviewed  by 
the NRC  to support the WBN  Unit  1 Cycle 2 core  reload changes in Amendment 7, 
dated September  11,  1997.  The instrumentation  setpoint calculation  in the current 
Revision 8 of WCAP-12096  is not affected by the 1.4% power uprate  of WBN, 
whereas the power calorimetric  uncertainty  reported in WCAP-14738,  Revision 0, is 
recalculated to account for the use  of the improved  LEFM  uncertainties.  This 
information  is provided  in the Westinghouse calculation "Power Calorimetric 
Measurement  Uncertainty Calculation for Watts Bar Unit  1 Power Uprate to 
3459 MWt"  in  Ref.  1, and  WCAP-14738 is accordingly  revised.  
In Ref. 6,  TVA stated that the Westinghouse  calculation  provides an uncertainty 
applicable  to WBN using site-specific  values, and is bounded by the 0.6% value.  
This bounding value is included  in the Caldon topical report and  its supplement and 
is an estimated total  power uncertainty based on an LEFM  measurement of flow in 
a generic single header feedwater system, similar to WBN feedwater system.  The 
site-specific Westinghouse calculation for the WBN power uprate indicates a total 
power uncertainty of 0.58%.  This uncertainty  is less than  the generic uncertainty 
(0.6%) estimated in the Caldon topical  report and its supplement.  Also the  current 
best estimate  by Caldon, based on the calibration test results of WBN  LEFM spool 
piece  in Ref. 7,  indicates a total  power uncertainty  of 0.4%.  Accordingly,  the 
Westinghouse calculation  is more conservative  than the actual test result of the 
WBN  LEFM spool piece and, therefore,  is acceptable.  
4.  Licensees for plant installations where the ultrasonic meter (including the  LEFM) 
was not installed with flow elements calibrated  to a site-specific piping  configuration 
(flow profiles and  meter factors not representative  of the plant-specific  installation), 
should provide additional justification  for use.  This justification should show either 
that the meter installation  is independent of the plant-specific flow profile for the 
stated accuracy or that the installation  can be shown to be equivalent  to known 
calibrations and the plant configuration  for the specific installation,  including the 
propagation  of flow profile  effects at higher Reynolds numbers.  Additionally, for 
previously installed  calibrated elements, the licensee should confirm  that the piping 
configuration  remains bounding  for the original  LEFM installation  and calibration 
assumptions.  
*  In Ref. 7, TVA submitted the WBN  LEFM  calibration test report.  This report 
describes the principles of operation  of Caldon's LEFM and gives the results of 
hydraulic laboratory calibration testing  of the WBN  LEFM spool piece in the plant
representative hydraulic geometry of a 32-inch-diameter feedwater piping system 
at the Alden Research Laboratories testing facility.  The tests were done at the 
maximum flow and Reynolds number for various hydraulic configurations  (meter 
alignments), and the  LEFM measurement uncertainty at the test Reynolds number 
was extrapolated  for the actual operating  Reynolds number of the modeled 
hydraulic system.  The resulting total power measurement uncertainty estimate is 
0.4%, as reported  in Ref. 7.  The testing demonstrated the measurement accuracy 
of the WBN LEFM for the site-specific piping configuration  and confirmed self 
diagnostics, the engineering  evaluation, and indications of the  LEFM.- 27-
The staff finds that the TVA's  response to these criteria  has sufficiently  resolved  the plant
specific concerns about  LEFM maintenance  and calibration,  hydraulic configuration,  processes 
and contingencies for an  inoperable  LEFM, and the methodology for the plant-specific 
calculations of the LEFM power measurement uncertainty.  
5.3  CONCLUSION 
The NRC staff evaluation found  both the supplemental  topical report,  ER-1 60P, and the 
Westinghouse calculation of the power calorimetric measurement  uncertainty for the WBN 
power uprate to be acceptable.  Based on the NRC staff's review of the supplemental topical 
report, the plant-specific Westinghouse calculation,  and the Caldon report on the WBN  LEFM 
spool piece calibration test, the staff finds that the WBN LEFM thermal power measurement 
uncertainty is limited to 0.6% of actual reactor thermal power and can support the proposed 
1.4%  uprate of the WBN licensed thermal power.  The staff also found that the licensee 
sufficiently addressed  the four additional criteria  outlined  in the staff SER on the Caldon topical 
report ER-80P.  
6.0  TS Changes 
The following TSs are affected:  1.1,  2.0, 3.7 and 5.9.5.  
TS  1.1:  the maximum power level  in MWt  is changed from  3411  to 3459 which reflects 
the 1.4% power increase.  
TS 2.0,  Figure 2.1.1-1,  "Reactor Core Safety  Limits", as noted  in TS Bases B 2.2.2, 
shows the intersection  of the points at which thermal power, RCS pressure and average 
temperature  result in acceptable  values of core parameters.  Since  RCS pressure and 
average temperature  remain unchanged,  Figure 2.1.1-1  is revised to show the correct 
intersections for the increase  in thermal power from  3411  MWt to 3459 MWt.  
TS 3.7.1,  "Main Steam Safety Valves" (MSSV),  ACTION  A, establishes reduced  thermal 
power limits for conditions where one or more SGs have one inoperable MSSV and, 
ACTION  B, with its supporting TS Table 3.7.1-1,  establishes limits where one or more 
SGs have two or more inoperable  MSSVs.  The TS has been revised to reduce the 
thermal  power limits to offset the increased value for reactor power so that, as noted in 
the TS Bases, the reduced thermal  power will be appropriately  matched to the relief 
capacity  of the remaining  MSSVs.  
TS 5.9.5, "Core Operating  Limits Report" (COLR),  is revised to update a statement 
about the analytical  methods to be used when (1) the LEFM is in operation and (2) when 
feedwater flow measurements from the LEFM are not available.  This ensures that the 
basis for plant operation  will appropriately  reflect the operability status of the LEFM and 
is, therefore, acceptable.  TS 5.9.5 is also revised to add references for the topical 
report for the  LEFM,  Caldon Engineering  Report 80P, "Improving Thermal Accuracy and 
Plant Safety While  Increasing Operating  Power Level  Using the  LEFM System," 
Revision 0, March  1997; and Caldon,  Inc.  Engineering Report-160P,  "Supplement to 
Topical  Report ER-80P:  Basis for a Power Uprate With the LEFM,"  Revision 0, May 
2000.- 28 -
The changes to TS 5.9.5 ensure that values of cycle-specific parameters  will  be 
determined using  NRC-approved  methodologies  that are applicable  to WBN.  Use of 
identified  methodology will ensure that applicable  limits for the plant safety analyses  are 
met.  
The staff notes that revisions have been made to the BASES for TS 3.7 to reflect that 
the overpower value at which design basis transients are conducted  is changed from 
102 percent of 3411 MWt to 100.6 percent of 3459 MWt to reflect that rated thermal 
power (RTP) is changed  from 3411  MWt to 3459  MWt.  
The TS changes reflect the  revised allowable power  limit of 3459 MWT with the LEFM 
operable, the combination of RCS power, pressure and average temperature necessary to 
ensure acceptable values of core  parameters, the reductions  in power  limits with  inoperable 
MSSVs necessary to offset the power increase, and the use of NRC-approved  methodologies 
associated with the  LEFM.  
The review of the power increase from 3411  MWt to 3459 MWt and the associated changes  in 
the TS was based  on the staff approval of the LEFM  Caldon report 80P (Ref. 3) and the 
supplemental  information in TVA's submittals,  which included  the supplemental  Caldon 160P 
report.  TS 5.9.5 specifies the  NRC approved  analytical  methods, specifically for application  to 
WBN,  to  be used  to determine the core power level.  The staff concludes  that this methodology 
and proposed TS changes are consistent with the  results of the safety analyses, as discussed 
throughout this report,  and are acceptable  for the power  increase  from 3411  MWt to 3459  MWt.  
7.0  RADIOLOGICAL  CONSEQUENCES 
The NRC staff reviewed the amendment request with regard to the radiological consequences 
of the proposed changes.  The licensee performed an assessment of the  radiological analyses 
to determine the impact on the radiological  consequences from the proposed increase  in rated 
thermal power.  Except for the SGTR,  the current dose analyses for WBN are based on a 
reactor thermal power  level  of 3565 MWt,  which is  104.5% of the current power rating  of 
3411  MWt, therefore  bounding the  1.4% power uprate.  The current SGTR analysis was 
performed at 102%  of the current rated thermal  power (i.e., 3479 MWt),  which  also bounds the 
requested  uprate with the  LEFM power measurement  uncertainty.  The licensee determined 
that the proposed power uprate  did not require  TVA to reanalyze the radiological calculations 
for WBN.  
The NRC staff reviewed the WBN  FSAR and the licensee's amendment request describing the 
proposed increase  in rated core thermal power.  The decrease  in  reactor power measurement 
uncertainty due to the installation of the LEFM effectively offsets the increase of 1.4%  in power 
level.  Staff review of the dose analyses in  Chapter 15 of the WBN FSAR  indicated that the 
current analyzed  power level bounds the requested uprate power level with the  reduced power 
uncertainty associated with the LEFM.  In the submittal, the licensee states that the current 
analyses performed to assess the effects  of mass and energy releases also remain valid for the 
proposed change.  
The current  FSAR Chapter 15 dose analyses are calculated with a power that bounds the 
requested power level  plus the 0.6%  power uncertainty  attributed to the LEFM.  Therefore,  the- 29 -
source terms utilized  in the these analyses bound those associated with  the proposed power 
level of 3459 MWt.  In addition,  the mass and energy releases after an accident remain 
bounding  for the proposed change.  Since the source terms and  release rates used  in the 
current analyses remain  bounding, the current calculated  radiological consequences  remain 
bounding.  
The staff has reviewed the licensee's amendment request and has concluded that the current 
design basis dose analyses, as documented in the WBN  FSAR,  remain acceptable  in that 
reasonable assurance exists that the dose consequences,  with the proposed 1.4% thermal 
power uprate, will remain the same or bounded by the current values.  The staff has determined 
the proposed changes are acceptable  with respect to the radiological  consequences  of the 
design basis accident analyses.  
8.0  LICENSED  OPERATOR  PERFORMANCE  TOPICS 
The  NRC staff reviewed the operator performance  aspects of TVA submittal dated June 7, 
2000.  Part of that submittal included TVA's responses to five questions related to operator 
performance that the staff had previously submitted to Texas  Utilities Electric Company for the 
Comanche Peak Steam Electric  Station.  
8.1  Findings 
The staff's evaluation  of the licensee's responses to the five questions is provided below.  
Question  9. -Discuss whether the power uprate will change the type and scope of plant 
emergency  and abnormal  operating  procedures.  Will  the power uprate change the type, scope,.  
and nature  of operator actions needed for accident  mitigation and will new operator actions be 
required? 
TVA  Response - In its submittal  of June 7, 2000, the licensee stated that the modest 1.4% 
power uprate is not expected  to have any significant effect on the manner  in which the 
operators control the plant, either during normal operations or transient conditions.  The 
licensee further stated that the power uprate will  lead to  minor changes in several plant 
parameters,  but that these changes will be treated  in a manner consistent with any other plant 
modification,  and will be included  in operator training accordingly.  
The staff concludes that the licensee's  provisions and controls for implementing  these changes, 
as discussed  in  Section 5.2 of this  report, are sufficient and do not warrant the creation  of 
regulatory requirements which would require prior NRC approval  of subsequent changes.  The 
staff finds the licensee's response to be satisfactory.  
Question  10. - Provide examples of operator actions that are particularly sensitive  to the 
proposed increase in power level and discuss how the power uprate will effect operator 
reliability or performance.  Identify all operator actions that will have their response times 
changed because of the power uprate.  Specify the expected response times before the power 
uprate and the new (reduced/increased)  response times.  Discuss why any reduced operator 
response  times are needed.  Discuss whether any reduction in  time available for operator 
actions, due to the power uprate, will significantly affect the operator's ability to complete the 
required manual actions in the times allowed.  Discuss results of simulator observations- 30 -
regarding  operator response times for operator actions  that are potentially sensitive to power 
uprate.  
TVA  Response - The licensee's response was similar to the previous answer with the additional 
statement that the power uprate will have no significant effect on the manner  in which  the 
operators control the plant,  including operator response  times.  
The staff finds the licensee's response to be satisfactory.  
Question  11.  - Discuss  all changes the power uprate will  have on control room alarms, controls, 
and displays.  For example, will zone markings on meters change (e.g., normal range,  marginal 
range, and out-of-tolerance  range)?  If changes will occur, discuss how they will be addressed.  
TVA  Response - The licensee responded  that no changes to control  room annunciators, 
controls and displays are required as a direct result of the power uprate.  The Nuclear 
Instrumentation System  will be adjusted to indicate the new 100% Reactor Thermal  Power 
(RTP)  in accordance  with TS requirements  and plant administrative controls.  Procedural 
guidance,  supplemented by plant computer displays, will  be developed to facilitate operation 
when the new LEFM  is unavailable.  The  reactor operators will  be trained  on the changes in  a 
manner consistent with any other design modification.  There are no new operator tasks 
required for safe shutdown  by implementing  this power uprate.  
The staff concludes that the licensee's provisions and controls for implementing these changes, 
as discussed  in section 5.2 of this report, are sufficient and do not warrant the creation of 
regulatory  requirements which would require  prior NRC approval of subsequent changes.  The 
staff finds the licensee's response to be satisfactory.  
Question 12.  - Discuss  all changes the power uprate will  have on the Safety Parameter  Display 
System (SPDS) and how they will  be addressed.  
TVA  Response  - The licensee stated that the  SPDS is unaffected by the proposed  1.4% 
increase in  RTP.  
The staff finds the licensee's  response to be satisfactory.  
Question 13. - Describe  all changes the  power uprate will have on the operator training program 
and the plant simulator.  Provide a copy of the post-modification test report (or test abstracts) to 
document  and support the effectiveness  of simulator changes as required  by American National 
Standards Institute/ American  Nuclear Society  (ANSI/ANS) 3.5-1985,  Section 5.4.1.  
Specifically, please propose a license condition and/or commitment that stipulates the following: 
(a)  Provide classroom  and simulation training on all changes that effect operator 
performance  caused by the power uprate modification.  
(b)  Complete simulator changes that are consistent with  ANSI/ANS 3.5-1985.  Simulator 
fidelity will be re-validated  in accordance  with ANSI/ANS 3.5-1985, Section 5.4.1, 
"Simulator Performance  Testing."  Simulator re-validation  will include comparison of 
individual simulated systems and components and simulated integrated  plant steady-31  -
state and transient performance  with  reference plant responses using similar startup 
test procedures.  
(c)  Complete  all control  room  and plant process computer system changes  as a result  of 
the  power uprate.  
(d)  Modify operator training  and the plant simulator, as required,  to address all related 
issues and discrepancies  that are identified during the startup testing program.  
TVA  Response - The licensee responded that changes associated with the power uprate will  be 
treated  in a manner consistent with  any plant modification,  and will be included  in operator 
training accordingly.  The simulator will  be modified to match  predicted plant values for the 
uprated power.  Following plant implementation,  startup and operation at the uprated  power, 
plant data will be collected  and incorporated as the reference  plant data for Simulator Steady 
State Performance Tests in accordance with  the Simulator Certification  annual testing program.  
The staff concludes that the licensee's provisions and controls for implementing  these changes, 
as discussed  in section  5.2 of this report, are sufficient and do not warrant the creation of 
regulatory requirements  which would require  prior NRC approval of subsequent changes.  The 
staff finds the licensee's response to be satisfactory.  
8.2  CONCLUSIONS 
The NRC staff concludes that all  of the review questions  related to operator  performance for 
the proposed power uprate  have been satisfactorily addressed.  The  NRC staff further 
concludes that the proposed power  uprate will not adversely affect simulator facility fidelity, 
operator performance,  or operator reliability.  
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10.0  STATE CONSULTATION 
In accordance with  the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee  State official was notified of 
the proposed issuance of the amendment.  The State official had no comments.  
11.0  ENVIRONMENTAL  CONSIDERATION 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21,  51.32 and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant  impact has been prepared and published  in the Federal  Register  on November 29, 
2000  (65 FR 71129).  Accordingly, based upon the Environmental Assessment the Commission 
has determined that issuance of the amendment will  not have a significant effect on the quality 
of the  human environment.  
12.0  CONCLUSION 
The Commission has concluded,  based. on the considerations discussed above, that:  (1) there 
is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered  by 
operation  in the proposed  manner, (2) such activities will be conducted  in compliance with the 
Commission's  regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the 
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.  
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